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Estimating the Earnings Loss Associated with a Criminal
Record and Suspended Driver’s License
Colleen Chien, Alexandra George, Srihari Shekhar, and Robert Apel 1
As states pass reforms to reduce the size of their prison populations, the number of Americans
physically incarcerated has declined. However, the number of people whose employment and
related opportunities are limited due to their criminal records continues to grow. Another
sanction is the loss of one's driver's licenses for reasons unrelated to driving. While many states
have laws on the books to redress these harms, a growing body of research has documented large
“second chance gaps” between eligibility and delivery of expungement and restored license
relief due to their poor administration. This paper is a first attempt to measure the cost of these
“paper prisons” of limited economic opportunity, in terms of annual lost earnings. Analyzing the
literature, we estimate the annual earnings loss associated with misdemeanor and felony
convictions to be $5,100 and $6,400, respectively, and that of a suspended license to be $12,700.
We use Texas as a case study for comparing the cost of “paper prisons” with the cost of physical
prisons. In Texas, individuals with criminal convictions may seal their records after a waiting
period and people that have lost driver’s licenses may get restored occupational driver’s licenses
to drive to work or school. Analyzing administrative data, this paper finds that approximately
5% of people eligible for relief have had their records sealed. The 670K people in the second
chance sealing gap translates to an annual earnings loss of about $3.5 billion annually. Using a
similar approach, we find that about 20% of the people that appear eligible for occupational
drivers’ licenses (ODLs) in Texas have received them, leaving about 430,000 people who could
have them without licenses; an earnings loss of about $5.5 billion. Based on these figures, we
find the cumulative annual earnings loss associated with Texas’s “paper prisons” to be
comparable with, and likely more than, the yearly cost to Texas of managing its physical prisons,
of around $3.6 billion.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Christian Watts was charged with felony drug possession after purchasing
MDMA (ecstasy) from a friend. 2 Watts pleaded guilty to a lower misdemeanor charge, and the
judge sentenced him to three months of house arrest and 36 months of probation.3 At an average
cost of $9.17 per day, Watts’s supervision cost federal taxpayers $9,904.4 But the consequences
of his conviction did not end there. Since Watts completed his sentence, he has been denied
civilian and military employment opportunities due to his record.5 Despite earning Associates
and Bachelors degrees, and the praise of a judge for his self-rehabilitation efforts,6 Watts has
been able to find work only as a dog walker and cross-fit trainer, jobs with average annual
incomes of around $35,000.7 Commenting that “my life is stuck in a standstill,”8 Watts has
abandoned plans to become a lawyer, a profession with an average annual income of about
$90,000.9 These figures imply a potential earnings gap of $55,000 per year, and associated with
it, a gap in productivity, skills, and tax revenue.
In 2002, Demetrice Moore, a Certified Nursing Assistant, was convicted of grand larceny
and sentenced to jail and costs, including the cost of the lawyer appointed to represent her
because she was indigent.10 Moore served her time, but could not repay the costs.11 As a result,
her driver’s license was automatically suspended.12 This interfered with her work because “[a]s a
2

Maya Rhodan, Misdemeanor Conviction Is Not a Big Deal, Right? Think Again, Tɪᴍᴇ, (April 24, 2014),
https://time.com/76356/a-misdemeanor-conviction-is-not-a-big-deal-right-think-again/.
3
Id. and United States of America v. Watts. Case no: 2:04-0146-PMP-RJJ. Motion to Terminate Supervised Release.
June 3, 2009.
4
$9.17 per day x 30 days per month x 36 months = $9,903.60. For per day probation supervision costs, see
Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System, Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs Cᴏᴜʀᴛs, (July 18, 2013),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-less-incarceration-federal-system.
5
U.S. v. Watts, 2:04-CR-00146-PMP-RJJ (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 2011).
6
Id. and Rʜᴏᴅᴀɴ, supra note 1 (At Watts’ hearing, the judge said, “I wish I had far more people before me who
show the kind of self rehabilitation and effort that you’ve demonstrated” and even shook Watts’ hand.)
7
Professional Dog Walker Salary in Las Vegas, NV, ZɪᴘRᴇᴄʀᴜɪᴛᴇʀ, (last visited November 5, 2021),
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Professional-Dog-Walker-Salary-in-Las-Vegas,NV and Fitness Trainer Salary
in Las Vegas, NV, ZɪᴘRᴇᴄʀᴜɪᴛᴇʀ, (last visited November 5, 2021),
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Fitness-Trainer-Salary-in-Las-Vegas,NV (listing average salaries at $30,830
and $37,602, respectively).
8
Rʜᴏᴅᴀɴ, supra note 1.
9
Prosecutor Salary in Las Vegas, NV, ZɪᴘRᴇᴄʀᴜɪᴛᴇʀ, (last visited November 5, 2021),
https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Prosecutor-Salary-in-Las-Vegas,NV. See also U.S. ᴠ. Wᴀᴛᴛs, supra note 4
(Watts explaining that “I want to continue to further my education and have an active application into Boyd school
of law for this fall semester. I'm hoping to pursue a career as a prosecutor. Law school is costly and at 37 years old
loans of that magnitude can be daunting. I did not want this to deter me from accomplishing my goal. I came to
discover if I served my country in the military, not only can I satisfy my sense of duty, contribute to the greater
good, but the government will help me with the cost of my education. I want very much to enlist as an officer and
serve, possibly in the National Guard. However, no branch of the military will accept me with my current federal
drug conviction”).
10
Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-By-State Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension Laws
for Failure to Pay Court Debts, Lᴇɢᴀʟ Aɪᴅ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, 3, (Fall 2017),
https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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CNA, she had to drive extensively to care for elderly and disabled patients in their homes.”13
Despite this, Moore attempted to keep working and was consequently convicted several times
and jailed for driving on a suspended license.14 In the end, Moore had to “stop working as a CNA
because of the required driving.”15 An average-to-experienced CNA makes around $33,000 to
$40,000 annually.16
Many have commented on the massive size of the American criminal justice system and
celebrated reforms to reduce it.17 But while the number of people put behind bars declines,18
those who have old convictions and criminal records19 continue to encounter structural barriers to
work or the deprivation of a driver’s license.20 Among the freedoms curtailed by such actions,
economic liberty stands out. As the Supreme Court commented about suspended licenses in the
case of Bell v. Burson: “Once licenses are issued. . . their continued possession may become
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees.”21
To remove these barriers, nearly every state has laws on the books that allow old,
generally minor, convictions to be expunged.22 In many states, lost licenses can be restored in

13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Nurse Journal Staff, Certified Nursing Assistant Salary Guide, NᴜʀsᴇJᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ, (January 20, 2022),
https://nursejournal.org/cna/salary/.
17
See Overcrowding and Overuse of Imprisonment in the United States, Aᴍᴇʀɪᴄᴀɴ Cɪᴠɪʟ Lɪʙᴇʀᴛɪᴇs Uɴɪᴏɴ, (May
2015), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Overincarceration/ACLU.pdf (discussing the causes of
the growth in the U.S.’s incarcerated population).
18
John Gramlich, America’s incarceration rate falls to lowest level since 1995, Pᴇᴡ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, (August 16,
2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/16/americas-incarceration-rate-lowest-since-1995/ (noting
that “[a]t the end of 2019, there were just under 2.1 million people behind bars in the U.S., including 1.43 million
under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 735,000 in the custody of locally run jails”)
19
Becki Goggins, New Blog Series Takes Closer Look at Findings of SEARCH/BJS Survey of State Criminal History
Information Systems, 2016, Sᴇᴀʀᴄʜ, (March 29, 2018),
https://www.search.org/new-blog-series-takes-closer-look-at-findings-of-search-bjs-survey-of-state-criminal-historyinformation-systems-2016/ (showing the growth in the number of subjects in state criminal history files, from ~81M
in 2006 to ~110M in 2016. These numbers, which represent biometric (fingerprint) data, contain duplicates).
20
See Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. ___ (2020) (in her concurring opinion, Justice Kagan notes that “several studies
have found that most license suspensions do not relate to driving at all; what they most relate to is being poor.” See
also Suspended/Revoked Working Group, Best Practices to Reducing Suspended Drivers, Aᴍᴇʀɪᴄᴀɴ Assᴏᴄɪᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏғ
Mᴏᴛᴏʀ Vᴇʜɪᴄʟᴇs, 34-37, (February 2013),
https://www.aamva.org/Suspended-and-Revoked-Drivers-Working-Group/ (building off of the Department of
Transportation’s H.S. 811 092, “Reasons for Drivers License Suspension, Recidivism and Crash Involvement among
Suspended/Revoked Drivers,” this study estimates that, based on a sample of drivers from six states in the U.S., the
number of people who had licenses suspended for reasons unrelated to driving increased from 21% to 29% between
2002 and 2006). Some states have reported declines, however; see, e.g. Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and
Geographic Variation in Driver’s License Suspensions: Evidence of Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19
Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 1, 4-5, 2020 (finding that, based on a random sample of about 7.6M drivers in
New Jersey, the prevalence of people with non-driving related suspensions between 2004 and 2018 decreased from
7.9% to 5%).
21
402 U.S. 535, 539, 1971.
22
In this article we use the word “expunged” to refer generally to the shielding of records from public view through
records remediations strategies such as sealing, orders of non-disclosure expungement, and expunction.
14
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order to support going to work or school.23 But as an emerging literature has documented, the
poor administration of “second chance” policies means that many of the people, and often, the
majority, that stand to benefit from, e.g., expunged records or restored licenses, are not receiving
the benefits of these laws. One of us has defined this difference as the “second chance gap,” and
estimated its size across a number of realms, including expungement, restoration of the right to
vote, and resentencing.24 An associated project, the Paper Prisons Initiative, has documented
uptake rates of records-expungement across over a dozen states, finding rates of less than 10%
— implying that over 90% of eligible people are not taking advantage of the law —- to be
common.25
The economic impacts of paper prisons are more difficult to quantify than the
out-of-pocket costs of physical prisons, but they are still consequential. Though the total
unemployment rate in January 2022 was less than 4%, the last estimate of unemployment of
formerly incarcerated people living in the United States, published in 2018, reported an
unemployment rate of “over 27% — higher than the total U.S. unemployment rate during any
historical period, including the Great Depression,”26 which figure was also close to triple the
national unemployment rate at the time.27
But the fact that the cost of paper prisons is largely unquantified and unknown makes it
difficult to know how much to prioritize closing the gap. It also obscures the cost of the poor
drafting of second chance laws, which, in many cases, are extremely complicated and become
applicable only after numerous conditions have been satisfied.28 Efforts to pass “Clean Slate”
bills that would help narrow the second chance gap have stalled across the country due to the

23

See What is a hardship license vs. restricted license comparison, Iɴᴛᴏxᴀʟᴏᴄᴋ, (June 30, 2021),
https://www.intoxalock.com/blog/post/difference-between-hardship-and-restricted-license/ (describing that states
including Florida, Indiana, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and Kentucky all have“hardship licenses” that allow certain
individuals to have licenses for going to work, and California, Texas, Washington, Virginia, and Iowa have
“restricted licenses” that serve a similar purpose). Such licenses are also available to drivers in Pennsylvania
(Occupational Limited Licenses, Pᴇɴɴsʏʟᴠᴀɴɪᴀ Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴ & Vᴇʜɪᴄʟᴇ Sᴇʀᴠɪᴄᴇs,
https://www.dmv.pa.gov/Information-Centers/Suspensions/Pages/Occupational-Limited-Licenses.aspx).
24
See Colleen Chien, America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gaps, 119 Mɪᴄʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 519, 519 (2020)
(analyzing a variety of second chance programs in the U.S. including clemency, compassionate release,
resentencing, and nonconvictions expungement, finding that in many cases “only a small fraction (less than 10
percent) of those eligible for relief actually received it”).
25
Id. (noting that across a variety of second chance programs in the U.S., “only a small fraction (less than 10
percent) of those eligible for relief actually received it”); See also J.J. Prescott and Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of
Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study, 133 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 2460, 2461 (2020) (finding that in Michigan “among
those legally eligible for expungement, just 6.5% obtain it within five years of eligibility”); Pᴀᴘᴇʀ Pʀɪsᴏɴs
Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, (last visited September 19, 2021), https://www.paperprisons.org/ (documenting the “uptake rate” of
expungement relief in states across the U.S.).
26
Lucius Couloute & Daniel Kopf, Out of Prison & Out of Work: Unemployment Among Formerly Incarcerated
People, Pʀɪsᴏɴ Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, (July 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/outofwork.html. (describing the
findings based on the National Former Prisoner Survey, conducted in 2008.)
27
Kimberly Amadeo, Unemployment Rate by Year Since 1929 Compared to Inflation and GDP, Tʜᴇ Bᴀʟᴀɴᴄᴇ, (last
updated January 28, 2022), https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year-3305506 (reporting a national
unemployment rate of 10% in 2009)
28
See Appendix A for a description of Texas's sealing law.
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cost of updating records.29 As the problem of paper prisons persists unabated, it is important to
quantify the economic costs of second chance gaps. This article does so by estimating the
earnings and employment consequences of old expungable convictions and lost driver’s licenses
that are available for restoration under existing law.
Part I of the article provides an overview of two of Texas’s second chance laws,
governing the grant of orders of non-disclosure (ONDs) and restoration of occupational driver’s
licenses (ODLs). It details the processes required to obtain each form of second chance relief and
explores how various administrative factors may contribute to gaps in their uptake. Part II then
describes the populations of people eligible for convictions and driver’s license relief, and our
methodology for estimating each second chance gap, measured by the number of individuals
with records who qualify for relief (“the current gap”), the share of people eligible for a given
second chance that have obtained it (“the uptake gap”), and the number of years it would take to
clear each second chance backlog based on the current pace of relief. Part III presents estimates
of the lost earnings and employment consequences associated with a criminal record and a lost
driver’s license. We then use these estimates and the findings from Part II to calculate the
earnings loss associated with Texas’s paper prisons.
We find that approximately 5% of people eligible for sealing relief have accessed it,
leaving a gap of about 670,000 people (with people in the gap having a last conviction, on
average, of 17 years ago). We estimate the earnings loss associated with this gap to be
approximately $3.5 billion annually. Using a similar approach, we find that about 20% of people
eligible for occupational drivers licenses (ODLs) in Texas have accessed them, leaving a gap of
430,000 people eligible for ODLs who have not gotten one, which translates into an earnings
loss of about $5.5 billion. Based on these figures, we find the cumulative annual earnings loss
associated with Texas’s “paper prisons” to exceed the yearly cost of funding physical prisons in
Texas, which is around $3.6 billion.
PART I: OVERVIEW OF TEXAS’ RECORD SEALING AND LICENSE
REINSTATEMENT LAWS
For our exploration of the economic impacts of the second chance gap, we used Texas as
a case study for a few reasons. First, Texas has the 9th largest economy in the world by GDP, and
prides itself on being business-friendly and a reliable source of skilled workers.30 Secondly, like
many states, Texas has been under fiscal pressure to reform and reduce the costs of its criminal

29

See, e.g. Washington state, which in 2020 passed a “Clean Slate” bill that would have narrowed but which the
Governor vetoed due to cost,. Iin part exacerbated by the anticipated cost of COVID expenditures. Rachel M.
Cohen, Washington Governor Vetoes Bill that Would Have Automatically Cleared Criminal Records, Tʜᴇ Aᴘᴘᴇᴀʟ,
(May 19, 2020), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/washington-governor-vetoes-clean-slate-bill/.
30
https://businessintexas.com/news/texas-enters-2021-as-worlds-9th-largest-economy-by-gdp/ (describing the
benefits of Texas for businesses as including “highly competitive tax climate, world-class infrastructure, a skilled
workforce of 14 million people, business-friendly economic policies and abundant quality of life,”
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justice system and has led the country in many respects in doing so.31 As part of this reform,
policymakers and politicians have widely celebrated the cost savings associated with closing
Texas’s physical prisons.32 However, while the number of Texans who were incarcerated in state
prisons and jails decreased by 27% between fiscal years 2005 and 2020,33 individuals with
criminal history in the state doubled over the same period, according to repository consortium
SEARCH.34 There are 5 million people in Texas’s database of people with convictions, and,
before the law was reformed in 2020, 1.4 million Texans, or 5% of the population, had
suspended licenses.35 As such, the extent to which people with records and suspended licenses
are integrated — or not — into the workforce has significant consequences for the Texas
economy.

31

Michael Haugen, Ten Years of Criminal Justice Reform in Texas, Rɪɢʜᴛ ᴏɴ Cʀɪᴍᴇ, (August 1, 2017),
https://rightoncrime.com/2017/08/ten-years-of-criminal-justice-reform-in-texas/ (describing states adopting justice
reinvestment packages similar to the ones in Texas).
32
In 2020, for example, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice projected that closing two Texas prisons would
“free up about $20 million in its budget.” Julie McCullogh, As the Texas prison population shrinks, the state is
closing two more lockups, Tʜᴇ Tᴇxᴀs Tʀɪʙᴜɴᴇ, (February 20, 2020),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2020/02/21/361405/as-the-texas-prison-population-shrinks-the-st
ate-is-closing-two-more-lockups/. This followed a 2017 estimate that Texas could “eliminate more than 2,000
beds...[and] save the state some $49.5 million” from closing four prisons. Brandi Grissom, With crime,
incarceration, rates falling, Texas closes record number of prisons, Tʜᴇ Dᴀʟʟᴀs Mᴏʀɴɪɴɢ Nᴇᴡs, (July 5, 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/07/05/with-crime-incarceration-rates-falling-texas-closes-record-nu
mber-of-prisons/.
33
From 152,213 people to 142,169 people. This excludes participants in the Substance Abuse Felony Program. See
Statistical Reports, Tᴇxᴀs Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Cʀɪᴍɪɴᴀʟ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ (2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013,
2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005) at 8 (all reports as of January 21, 2022 available at
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/publications/statistical_reports.html).
34
Data from bi-annual Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, SEARCH (2020, 2008, 2009, 2011,
2014, 2015, 2018, 2020) at Table 1. (2020 report available e.g. at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/255651.pdf). In 2006, the repository had 7,986,000 records (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Survey of State Criminal History Information, 2003, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ, (February
2006), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/sschis03.pdf), in 2018 that number was 15,437,000 (Becki R. Goggins &
Dennis A. DeBacco, Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2016: A Criminal Justice Information
Policy Report, Sᴇᴀʀᴄʜ, (February 2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf).
35
At least 400,000 licenses remain suspended though the elimination of a controversial program restored 1.4M
licenses. Letter from Department of Public Safety to Karly Jo Dixon from the Texas Fair Defense Project. Letter on
file with authors. For more on the significance of the repeal of the controversial program, see Emily Gerrick & Mary
Mergler, Commentary: Lawmakers Need to fix another problem that buries Texas drivers in fines, Sᴛᴀᴛᴇsᴍᴀɴ, (last
updated July 5, 2020), https://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=340640 (noting that “[we]e cannot
overstate how significant the repeal of this program is. When the law goes into effect in September, 1.4 million
license suspensions will be lifted, and nearly $2.5 billion of surcharge debt will be wiped clean. Huge numbers of
people will escape the cycle of suspensions and get back on the road driving legally. This repeal will help vulnerable
Texans achieve financial stability, save taxpayer dollars and boost the Texas economy.”)
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Sources: Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Annual Statistical Reports for fiscal years 2005 through 2020 (for
jail and prison population data)36; SEARCH (for criminal subjects data).37

Third, over the past several decades, Texas has introduced laws that advance both
criminal justice and workforce-related objectives, allowing individuals with old convictions to
get them sealed and individuals that have lost their licenses a chance to regain their right to drive
to work or school. The scale of Texas’s criminal justice system and its adoption of many second
chance reforms, as well as the lack of attention paid to their implementation, make the state a
good subject for study and analysis.
This section provides an overview of Texas’s second chance laws, describing their
legislative history and the processes set forth by the law for obtaining relief. These laws share the
goals of advancing economic interests and removing barriers to work, as well as preserving
public safety.
A. Record Relief: Order of Non-Disclosure
In Texas, every time a person is convicted of a crime, this event is memorialized in the
36

Data about the size of the on hand state jail and prison population obtained from Annual Statistical Reports, Tᴇxᴀs
Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Cʀɪᴍɪɴᴀʟ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ, 8 (2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009,
2009, 2007, 2006, 2005) (reports last available on January 23, 2022,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/publications/statistical_reports.html). Even though the TDCJ places people in jail, prison,
and Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility (SAFP) Program in the same “on hand” category in its annual
reports, we exclude the number of people in the SAFP Program from our estimate of the size of the state's prison and
jail population.
37
Based on data obtained from Becki Goggins et al; Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2020: A
Criminal Justice Information Policy Report, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/255651.pdf,
Table 1 (listing the total number of records in the state repository as of Dec 2018) (2020) and previous versions of
the report, at Table 1.
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person’s criminal record, which sets off various “collateral consequences,” or civil punishments
that follow a person long after time has been served. The National Inventory of Collateral
Consequences of Conviction has cataloged over 1,600 civil sanctions in Texas alone for people
with criminal records spanning child support, employment, volunteering, civic participation, real
estate, visitation and parental rights, and housing residency.38 People with certain criminal
records are disqualified from numerous top jobs for people without college degrees. “Private
security” on the Texas Labor Analysis’ list of the top 25 projected occupations for individuals
with a maximum education of postsecondary non-degree,39 with wages from ~$21,000 to
~$37,000,40 is one of them.41
In an effort to give people a second chance and allow them to more easily find
employment, the Texas Legislature passed Texas Gov. Code Chap. 411, creating two pathways
for individuals to remove their past criminal records from public access. The first pathway
provides relief via an expunction, which occurs when all “information about an arrest, charge, or
conviction [is removed] from [one’]s permanent records.”42 Expunction is only available for
felony and Class A, B, and C misdemeanor nonconvictions. 43 In contrast, the second pathway, an
“Order of Nondisclosure” (OND), seals records from the general public, while allowing certain
employers and government agencies to “see through” the OND.44 Sealing via OND is available
to people convicted of first-time low-level misdemeanor convictions as well as to those who
completed deferred adjudication community supervision (“deferred adjudication”) for low-level
offenses. This article focuses only on sealing of convictions because the earnings impact of a
conviction is recognized to be much more significant than a non-conviction.45 As such, we will
use “sealing” throughout the remainder of the article to refer exclusively to record relief granted
using the OND pathway.
In 2003, S.B. 1477 put the OND pathway on the books in Texas,46 in an effort to remove
38

Collateral Consequences Inventory, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Iɴᴠᴇɴᴛᴏʀʏ ᴏғ Cᴏʟʟᴀᴛᴇʀᴀʟ Cᴏɴsᴇᴏ̨ᴜᴇɴᴄᴇs, (last visited November 5,
2021), https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences (select “Texas”).
39
Top Statistics - Texas - Projections - No Education Requirement, High School Diploma, or Postsecondary
Non-Degree, Tᴇxᴀs Lᴀʙᴏʀ Aɴᴀʟʏsɪs, Report generated August 27, 2021.
40
Demand Analysis - Occupational Detail - Texas - Security Guards (SOC 33-9032), Tᴇxᴀs Lᴀʙᴏʀ Aɴᴀʟʏsɪs, Report
generated August 27, 2021.
41
Collateral Consequences Inventory, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Iɴᴠᴇɴᴛᴏʀʏ ᴏғ Cᴏʟʟᴀᴛᴇʀᴀʟ Cᴏɴsᴇᴏ̨ᴜᴇɴᴄᴇs, supra note ___ (specify
“private security, investigations, and locksmiths” as a keyword.)
42
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 55.01 (2005). For more on the legislature’s intent for expunction to redress
the harm associated with criminal justice involvement, see also State v. T.S.N, 547 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. 2018) (noting
that the state’s expunction statute allows for expunction “in limited, specific circumstances…[with the] intent to,
under certain circumstances, free persons from the permanent shadow and burden of an arrest record, even while
requiring arrest records to be maintained for use in subsequent punishment proceedings and to document and deter
recidivism.”
43
Id.
44
Expunctions in Texas, Tᴇxᴀs Yᴏᴜɴɢ Lᴀᴡʏᴇʀs Assᴏᴄɪᴀᴛɪᴏɴ & ᴛʜᴇ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ Bᴀʀ ᴏғ Tᴇxᴀs, 5, (2010 and 2019),
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Our_Legal_System1&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=23459 and Tex. Gov. Code Sec. 411.0765. Thank you to Derek Cohen of the Texas Policy Lab for
raising this to us in a comment on a previous draft.
45
See Chien, supra note ___ at ___. (providing an overview of this impact literature) [pin/add’l parenthetical
needed]
46
Id.
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impositions on a “person's ability to obtain a desired job or position for many years after the
offense.”47 In 2015, the 84th Texas Legislature passed S.B. 1902 to “[give] reformed offenders a
second chance, creating a safer Texas, and increasing the workforce with individuals who are no
longer limited by their minor criminal histories” by making sealing of deferred adjudication
dismissals “automatic.”48 This was followed two years later by H.B. 3016 to further expand
eligibility.49
Despite these revisions, the scope of Texas’s record sealing law remains narrow. Offenses
that are given deferred adjudication up to a maximum duration50 are eligible for relief following
successful completion of community supervision and dismissal.51 First offense misdemeanor
convictions, after a two-year waiting period following sentence completion, are also generally
eligible as long as there have been no prior convictions or deferred adjudications.52 First-time
driving while intoxicated (DWI) offenses are eligible after a two-to-five year waiting period.53
Offenses involving violence besides simple assault, sex crimes, or a handful of other crimes,54 or
that are committed by individuals who have been convicted of certain crimes, are disqualified or
have longer waiting periods.55
There are two processes people can use to apply for record sealing. The first process, the
petition route, is used for convictions, most misdemeanors and felonies given deferred
adjudication.56 The petition process starts with an individual submitting a petition and a fee to the
“clerk of the court. . . that sentenced [them] or placed [them] on community supervision. . . or

47

Royce West, C.S.S.B. 1477 Bill Analysis, Sᴇɴᴀᴛᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, 1, (May 8, 2003),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/78R/analysis/pdf/SB01477S.pdf#navpanes=0.
48
Charles Perry, S.B. 1902 Bill Analysis, Sᴇɴᴀᴛᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, 1, (April 17, 2015),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/analysis/pdf/SB01902I.pdf#navpanes=0.
49
Senfronia Thompson et al., C.S.H.B. 3016 Bill Analysis, Sᴇɴᴀᴛᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, (May 18, 2017),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/85R/analysis/pdf/HB03016S.pdf#navpanes=0.
50
A maximum of 2 years of community supervision following misdemeanors and 10 years of community
supervision for a felony. Art. 42A.103
51
Texas Government Code §42A.102, Texas Government Code §411.0725.
52
Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.073, 411.0735. Some convictions have a shorter waiting period, but for simplicity and to
be conservative, we do not model these shorter periods, as described in the Appendix.
53
Tex. Gov’t Code §411.0736 (2017).
54
Including Boating while intoxicated (Penal Code §49.06), Flying while intoxicated (Penal Code §49.05),
Assembling or operating an amusement ride while intoxicated (Penal Code §49.065), or Organized Crime (Penal
Code Chapter 71)
55
Tex. Gov. Code §411.0735(c-1) (2015). People are ineligible to have their records sealed if they have ever been
convicted of or received deferred adjudication for offenses including homicide, human trafficking, aggravated
kidnapping, child or elder abuse, stalking, and offenses that require registration as a sex offender. Texas Government
Code §411.074(b) (2015). Payment of legal financial obligations, if required for sentence completion, is also
required. Texas Government Code §411.0735(b) (2015); Texas Government Code §411.0736(b) (2017).
56
Tex. Gov’t Code §§411.0735 and 411.0725. See also Nondisclosure - Procedure for Deferred Adjudication - for
Felonies and Certain Misdemeanors - Under Section 411.0725, Tᴇxᴀs Lᴀᴡ Hᴇʟᴘ, (last updated January 22, 2022),
https://texaslawhelp.org/article/nondisclosure-procedure-for-deferred-adjudication-for-felonies-and-certain-misdeme
anors-under; Nondisclosure - Procedure for Conviction for Certain Misdemeanors - Under Section 411.0735, Tᴇxᴀs
Lᴀᴡ Hᴇʟᴘ, (January 21, 2022),
https://d9.texaslawhelp.org/article/nondisclosure-procedure-for-conviction-for-certain-misdemeanors-under-section4110735.
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deferred adjudication. . . .”57 Although the filing fee can vary by county,58 “the petition must be
accompanied by payment of a $28 fee to the clerk of the court in addition to any other fee that
generally applies to the filing of a civil petition.”59 After submitting a petition, the court holds a
trial to determine whether the petitioner is eligible for sealing and whether sealing the
petitioner’s record “is in the best interests of justice.”60 If the court answers both questions
affirmatively, the relief is granted and the record is sealed.61
The second process of sealing one’s record, the submission route, is used only for
nonviolent first-time misdemeanor offenses that received a deferred adjudication community
supervision sentence that was completed and dismissed on or after September 1, 2017.62 The
submission route does not require a petition.63 64 Instead, to initiate the process, the applicant
must “[p]resent evidence necessary to establish that [they] are eligible to receive an order under
Section 411.072,” which typically involves filing a Letter Requesting an Order of Nondisclosure
Under Section 411.072.65 When submitting the Letter to the clerk, the applicant must also pay a
$28 fee or request a fee waiver.66 A judge will then review the evidence and seal the record if the
applicant meets the eligibility criteria.67 Despite the procedural differences between the two
record sealing processes, both involve legal fees, court fees, and a petition initiated by the
applicant, which requires awareness of both eligibility and the possibility of sealing.
B. Driver’s License Restoration: Occupational Driver’s License
In Texas, individuals can lose their licenses for a variety of reasons ranging from minor
driving-related offenses (e.g., not having insurance, outdated registration, or not signaling68), to

57

An Overview of Orders of Nondisclosure, Tᴇxᴀs Oғғɪᴄᴇ ᴏғ Cᴏᴜʀᴛ Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 2, (last updated January 2020),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1445464/overview-of-orders-of-nondisclosure-2020.pdf.
58
Orders of Nondisclosure Overview, Tᴇxᴀs Oғғɪᴄᴇ ᴏғ Cᴏᴜʀᴛ Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 5, (last updated April 2017),
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/821650/order-of-nondisclosure-overview.pdf.
59
Texas Administrative Code §411.0745(b) (2015).
60
Collateral Consequences Resource Center, Texas: Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, Rᴇsᴛᴏʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏғ Rɪɢʜᴛs
Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, (last updated May 20, 2021),
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/texas-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/.
61
Id.
62
Nondisclosure - Deferred Adjudication Community Supervision for Certain Nonviolent Misdemeanors - Under
Section 411.072, Tᴇxᴀs Lᴀᴡ Hᴇʟᴘ, (last updated January 21, 2022),
https://texaslawhelp.org/article/nondisclosure-deferred-adjudication-community-supervision-for-certain-nonviolentmisdemeanors-under.
63
Id.
64
Texas Criminal Law: Orders of Nondisclosure, Sᴀᴘᴜᴛᴏ Lᴀᴡ, (last visited September 18, 2021),
https://saputo.law/criminal-law/record-clearing/orders-of-nondisclosure/ (also explaining that although some call
this type of OND “automated,” this is misleading because an individual must still initiate the process).
65
Id., 11.
66
Id., 11-12.
67
Id., 11.
68
Chris Abel, Failure to Appear and Traffic Violations, Aʙᴇʟ Lᴀᴡ Fɪʀᴍ, (last visited September 20, 2021),
https://www.flowermoundcriminaldefense.com/failure-appear-and-traffic-violations.
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serious driving offenses (e.g., “a habitually reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle”69).
Individuals can also lose their driver’s license for non-driving related offenses, such as “fail[ing]
to appear for a citation (FTA) or fail[ing] to satisfy a judgment ordering the payment of a fine” or
fee.70 Once an individual loses their driver’s license, that person is faced with a difficult choice:
find alternatives for basic tasks like driving to work or school, or risking further criminalization
if they are caught driving without a license.71
To redress the productivity-related harms associated with not having a driver’s license,72
Texas Transportation Code Section 521 Subchapter L allows certain individuals to apply for an
Occupational Driver’s License (ODL) to regain their rights to drive to work and school. The
legislative history suggests that the goal of providing ODLs was to support employment. For
instance, in 1969 Senator William T. Moore noted that “[t]he law relating to driver’s licenses is
now discriminatory in that it deprives many persons of the privilege of following their
occupations and earning a living.”73 S.B. 743, which “provide[d] for the issuance of an
occupational license to certain people who have had their license suspended” followed.74 In 2015
the 84th Legislature passed H.B. 2246 to both balance the need for public safety, vis-a-vis
individuals with licenses suspended due to past intoxication, with the desire to help such
individuals “continue to support themselves and their families.”75 To effect this goal, ODLs were
made available following the installation of an ignition interlock device.76
A more recent, related development to restore driver’s licenses was the 2019 repeal of the
Driver's Responsibility Program (DRP), which controversially imposed large fines for often
minor traffic offenses (e.g., speeding or driving without insurance) for the funding of trauma
centers in rural areas.77 The program’s end resulted in the restoration of thousands of licenses.
69

Texas Government Code §521.292(a)(2) (1999). See also Driver’s License Enforcement Actions, Tᴇxᴀs
Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ, (last visited September 20, 2021),
https://www.dps.texas.gov/internetforms/Forms/DL-176.pdf (listing the reasons individuals can have their licenses
revoked, suspended, and/or disqualified).
70
Failure to Appear/Failure to Pay Program, Tᴇxᴀs Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ, (last visited September 20,
2021), https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/failure-appearfailure-pay-program.
71
Driven By Debt, Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, (December 13, 2018),
https://report.texasappleseed.org/driven-by-debt/.
72
As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, see Bell v. Burson (1971), supra note __.
73
William T. Moore, S.B. 753 Bill Analysis, Sᴇɴᴀᴛᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ, 8, (May 7, 1969),
https://lrl.texas.gov/LASDOCS/61R/SB743/SB743_61R.pdf#page=8.
74
Id.
75
Jason Villalba et al., H.B. 2246 Bill Analysis, Sᴇɴᴀᴛᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀr, (May 18, 2015),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/84R/analysis/pdf/HB02246E.pdf#navpanes=0.
76
Texas Transportation Code §521.244(e). (creating OND eligibility based on evidence of financial responsibility
and proof of the installation of an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle operated by the individual.)
77
Described by Morgan Smith, To pay for trauma centers, state program sinks thousands of Texas drivers into deep
debt, Tʜᴇ Tᴇxᴀs Tʀɪʙᴜɴᴇ, (August 27, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/27/pay-trauma-centers-texas-sinks-thousands-drivers-deep-debt/ (describing
how the program, originally intended to "hold bad drivers responsible for the damage they caused, with the license
suspensions having the added benefit of keeping them off the roads" was eventually seen as a “massive failure”).
See also Matthew Menendez et al., Fees and Fines: A Fiscal Analysis of Three States and Ten Counties, Bʀᴇɴɴᴀɴ
Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ ғᴏʀ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ, 26, (November 21, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-fees-and-fines.
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However, “an estimated 500,000 individuals’ licenses remained suspended after their DRP
surcharges were eliminated,”78 a figure consistent with the data reported in this study.
To obtain an ODL under Texas Transportation Code Section 521 Subchapter L, one must
demonstrate “an essential need” for the ODL, for example as evidenced by the need to drive to
work or to school, and a lack of an alternative transportation option.79 However, individuals are
ineligible for ODLs if they have “lost [their] driving privileges because of a mental or physical
disability,” have “lost [their] driving privileges for failure to pay child support,” have “received
two ODLs in the past 10 years after a conviction,” or “have a ‘hard suspension’ waiting period
due to a prior DWI arrest or conviction.”80 ODLs are also unavailable to individuals who need a
license to drive a commercial motor vehicle.81
To obtain an ODL, an eligible individual must complete a petition, in accordance with
local court requirements.82 Next, the applicant must file the petition and submit a filing fee.83 If
their license was “automatically suspended or canceled following a conviction, [the applicant
should] file the Petition in the same court that convicted [them].”84 If not, they can choose to file
the petition “in the county where [they] live or where the offense occurred.”85 Following filing,
there is a hearing where a judge reviews the petition and other paperwork of the petitioner,
including a Certified Abstract of the petitioner’s full driving record, an SR-22 Proof of Insurance
from the petitioner’s insurance company, and evidence that the petitioner needs the license to go
to work, attend school, etc.86 The judge will then decide whether to grant an ODL.87
C. Barriers to Relief Under Texas’s Second Chance Laws
As discussed above, Texas enacted its record sealing and driver’s relicensing laws with
the goals of reducing the size of the criminal justice system and increasing accessibility to
second chances and workforce opportunities. However, three administrative burdens placed on
applicants by the second chance laws limit the legislature’s success in meeting these goals.88
78

Tᴇxᴀs Lᴀᴡ Hᴇʟᴘ, supra note 72.
Texas Occupational Driver’s License, 1, (last visited January 20, 2022),
https://www.co.chambers.tx.us/upload/page/0100/docs/Occupational%20DL/BrochureODL.pdf.
80
Id. For more on hard suspension waiting periods, see Occupational Driver’s License, Tᴇxᴀs Lᴀᴡ Hᴇʟᴘ, (last
updated June 2, 2021), https://texaslawhelp.org/guide/occupational-drivers-license/?tab=0.
81
Id.
82
Id, 2.
83
Supra note 75, 3.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
A related area of literature about administrative burdens is growing quickly. For instance, see Julian Christensen
et al., Human Capital and Administrative Burden: The Role of Cognitive Resources in Citizen-State Interactions, 80
Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ 127, (January/February 2020) (describing the ways in which “citizens with lower
levels of human capital” experience greater administrative burdens, which contributes to reinforcing inequality);
Pᴀᴍᴇʟᴀ Hᴇʀᴅ & Dᴏɴᴀʟᴅ P. Mᴏʏɪɴʜᴀɴ, Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ Bᴜʀᴅᴇɴ: Pᴏʟɪᴄʏᴍᴀᴋɪɴɢ ʙʏ Oᴛʜᴇʀ Mᴇᴀɴs (2018) (arguing
that administrative burdens are conscious policy choices); Elizabeth Linos et al., Nudging Early Reduces
Administrative Burden: Three Field Experiments to Improve Code Enforcement, 39 Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Aɴᴀʟʏsɪs ᴀɴᴅ
79
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First, the petition process in both cases requires an individual not only to prove they deserve a
second chance, but also to ascertain the law and fill out potentially confusing paperwork.
Second, the requirement that individuals seeking a second chance attend a hearing similarly
burdens people with challenges ranging from getting a hearing on the calendar (which requires
successfully submitting a petition) to attending a hearing (which can involve taking time off of
work, traveling, etc.). Third, complex criteria that frequently evolve make it difficult for
individuals to keep up with the law and determine their eligibility. These administrative barriers
to petitioners not only contrast with the automatic removal of rights and collateral consequences
after a misdemeanor conviction, incarceration, or the suspension of a driver’s license, but also
contribute to the gap in delivery of record cleaning and license restoration, as quantified in the
next part.
PART II: ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF TEXAS’S SEALING AND DRIVER’S LICENSE
RESTORATION SECOND CHANCE GAPS89
While Texas legislatures have passed second chance laws to advance a variety of goals,
the benefits of second chance relief depend on its delivery. In this part, we start by profiling the
people in each target population. Analyzing criminal convictions data from the state, we find
individuals with convictions on average to be of working age (mid-40s) and on average, have a
last conviction from over a decade ago. The available evidence suggests that people with
suspended licenses appear to be a bit younger (30-40), and have their licenses suspended on
average for five years and seven months.
To ascertain the number of people eligible to have their convictions sealed,90 we applied a
simplified version of the sealing law to criminal convictions records to estimate the size of
Texas’s “second chance sealing gap” and “second chance driver restoration gap.” Based on our
analysis, we estimate that about 670,000 people are able to have their records cleared, 59,000
people completely, to achieve a “clean slate” under existing law (Table 1). For this eligible
population, the average number of years since the last conviction is about 17 (median = 15
years). Furthermore, 430,000 people appear eligible to apply for an ODL to drive to work or
school. These numbers translate into a 5% and 17% uptake rate of sealing and driver’s license
reinstatements, respectively. (Table 1)
A. The Texas Criminal Population That Could Benefit from Sealing Relief

Mᴀɴᴀɢᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ 243, (Winter 2020) (uses a field experiment to demonstrate that learning costs, compliance costs, and
psychological costs help to explain why residents do not always take up programs for which they are eligible”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 Dᴜᴋᴇ L. J. 1843, (2019) (argues that deregulation driven by data and behavioral
information should be undertaken due to the 9.78 billion hours of “sludge” paperwork Americans completed in 2018
for the government, but notes that such deregulation will be filled with numerous tradeoffs).
89
Language modified and adapted from Colleen Chien et al., The Texas Second Chance Non-Disclosure/Sealing
Gap, Pᴀᴘᴇʀ Pʀɪsᴏɴs Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, (last visited January 21, 2022), https://www.paperprisons.org/states/TX.html.
90
Cʜɪᴇɴ, supra note 20.
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Before estimating the size of the population entitled to second chance relief, it is worth
considering the current size and characteristics of the existing Texas criminal population, as
reflected in the dataset upon which we rely for our records sealing analysis: the Texas
Computerized Criminal History System (CCH). Maintained by the Texas Department of Public
Safety, the CCH is a database containing all publicly available convictions for adults from 1976
to the date of extraction.91 This database is quite large, containing over 5.2 million Texans who
have publicly available convictions records. However, the true size of Texas's conviction
population is smaller because the CCH data likely includes individuals who are deceased. To
account for this, we removed all individuals over the age of 80 years old from the dataset on the
basis that the average life expectancy for Americans in 2019 was 78.8 years. 92 After doing so, we
estimate that approximately 4.8 million Texans (~16.4% of the state’s adult population in 2020)
have publicly available convictions records.93 This estimate is at best an approximation because
it fails to account for the thousands of people who move in and out of the Lone Star State each
year. This database also does not include people with non-conviction and deferred
adjudication-only records, who are also eligible for records relief under the law.94
Analyzing a random sample selected from the database of 150,000 people, we find that
about 80% have felony convictions and 62% have misdemeanor convictions. The most common
charges include drug possession, driving while intoxicated, and felony burglary as well as
misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury to a family member (Appendix Table 1). Consistent
with general trends, the population is overwhelmingly male. But while the average

91

About CCH, Tᴇxᴀs Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ, (last visited August 20, 2021),
https://publicsite.dps.texas.gov/DpsWebsite/CriminalHistory/AboutCch.aspx (also see this source for more about the
CCH). Per the Department of Public Safety, “Computerized Criminal History (CCH) was created in 1976 and we
began sending the conviction database in 1998. A person’s criminal history is retained for 125 years from their date
of birth.” See email from Texas Department of Public Safety, on file with editors. < for editors:
https://app.sparkmailapp.com/web-share/sW1CF6EOzhRBYaJTOh-6TdDpbW6qQLxd8W2CwfVq >
92
National Center for Health Statistics, Life Expectancy, Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀs ғᴏʀ Dɪsᴇᴀsᴇ Cᴏɴᴛʀᴏʟ ᴀɴᴅ Pʀᴇᴠᴇɴᴛɪᴏɴ, (January 8,
2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-expectancy.htm.
93
America Counts Staff, Texas Added Almost 4 Million People Last Decade, Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs Cᴇɴsᴜs Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ,
(August 25, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/texas-population-change-between-census-decade.html. ~16.4%
= 4.8M divided by Texas's adult population in 2020, which we calculated by multiplying the size of Texas's
Population in 2020 (29,145,055 people) by the percentage of the population over the age of 18 (75%).
94
See Appendix __ for details.
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Table 1: The Population of People in Texas with Convictions
Estimated Number of People with 4.8M
Convictions
% Male

85%

Top Convictions - Felonies

poss cs pg 1 <1g (11.4%), DWI 3rd
or more (4.2%), burglary (3.7%)

Top Convictions - Misdemeanors

poss marij <2oz (8.3%), DWI
(5.6%), assault (3.7%)

Avg Years since last Conviction

12.6 (median = 11)

Average Age at First Conviction

28 (median =27)

Average Current Age of People with 45
Convictions
White and Latinx % (share in pop = 69%
82%)
Black % (share in pop = 13%)

31%

Asian % (share in pop = 5%)

1%

Source: Authors’ analysis based on the Texas CCH database.

age at first conviction is 28, the average current age of people in the sample is 45. On average,
the last conviction of each person was 12.6 years ago. From an earnings perspective this implies
that the average age of people who live with convictions in Texas overlaps with the years in
which workers typically hit their peak earnings.95
Previous research finds that the racial disparities in Texas's criminal justice system are
significant. For example, although Black people account for 13% of the state population,96 they
make up 33% of the Texas prison population.97 In contrast, white people make up 44% of the
state population but account for just 33% of the prison population.98 Thus, as of 2020, Black

95

Julia Carpenter, Millennials’ High-Earning Years Are Here, but It Doesn’t Feel That Way, Tʜᴇ Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛʀᴇᴇᴛ
Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ, (August 12, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-high-earning-years-are-here-but-it-doesnt-feel-that-way-11628769603
(indicating, based on figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, that workers typically experience peak earnings
“between the ages of 35 and 54”).
96
Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in State Prisons, Tʜᴇ Sᴇɴᴛᴇɴᴄɪɴɢ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ.
(October 13, 2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/ at 7.
97
Incarceration Trends in Texas, Vᴇʀᴀ Iɴsᴛɪᴛᴜᴛᴇ ᴏғ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ, (December 2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-texas.pdf.
98
Id.
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people are 3.4 times more likely to be in prison than white people in Texas.99 In contrast, Latinx
and Asian people are underrepresented in the prison population relative to their representation in
the population in general.100
The data we analyzed, from the Texas Department of Public Safety, suggests similar
disparities in the breakdown of felony and misdemeanor convictions by race. For instance, even
though Black people make up just 13% of Texas's population, we find that Black people make up
30% of people with misdemeanor convictions and 31% of people with felony convictions in our
database. Whites and Asians appear to be underrepresented in felony and misdemeanor
convictions relative to their representation in the population in general. (Table 1)
B. The Texas Population That Could Benefit from License Restoration Relief
In contrast to the population of people with criminal records, less is known about the
demographic characteristics of people with suspended licenses. The populations are distinct,
however, as driver’s license suspensions are administrative penalties that, in Texas, generally
follow non-compliance with court-ordered fines and fees or requests to appear.101 This means that
license suspensions often impact people who haven’t committed serious crimes,102 or even been
accused of them.
Other studies have considered license suspension programs in Texas, North Carolina, and
New Jersey. Though the details of each suspension program are unique, the available evidence
suggests that individuals with suspended licenses tend to draw disproportionately from
low-income, urban communities and particularly harm the Black community.
Carnegie et al.’s study of New Jersey drivers from 2007 reports that “only 16.5 percent of
New Jersey licensed drivers reside in lower income zip codes, while 43 percent of all suspended
drivers live there.”103 A later study by Joyce et al. 104 of all suspended licenses in New Jersey from
2004 to 2018 found that the median household income for people with non-driving related
suspensions was about $78,000,105 which is about $14,000 lower than the median household
99

Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in State Prisons, Tʜᴇ Sᴇɴᴛᴇɴᴄɪɴɢ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, 21
(October 13, 2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/.
100
See Table 1 for a snapshot of the Texas criminal population, by race.
101
102

Justin Wm. Moyer, More than 7 million people may have lost driver’s licenses because of traffic debt,
Wᴀsʜɪɴɢᴛᴏɴ Pᴏsᴛ (May 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/more-than-7-million-people-may-have-lost-drivers-licenses-be
cause-of-traffic-debt/2018/05/19/97678c08-5785-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html (noting that “[d]river’s
license suspensions were criticized by anti-poverty advocates after a 2015 federal investigation, focused on
Ferguson, Mo., revealed that law enforcement used fines to raise revenue for state and local governments”).
103
Jon A. Carnegie et al., Driver’s License Suspensions, Impacts and Fairness Study, Nᴇᴡ Jᴇʀsᴇʏ Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ
Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 66 (August 2007).
104
Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and Geographic Variation in Driver’s License Suspensions: Evidence of
Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19 Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 1, 6 (2020).
105
Quick Facts: New Jersey, Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs Cᴇɴsᴜs Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ, (last visited January 23, 2022),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/NJ/SBO001212.
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income of $82,000 in 2019.106 In contrast, the median household income for people who did not
have suspensions was nearly $105,000, about $23,000 above New Jersey’s median household
income.107 Although estimates about the average or median income of people with suspended
licenses is unavailable for Texas, researchers for the Texas Fair Defense Project and Texas
Appleseed found a negative correlation between the number of license suspensions and the
household income in both Houston108 and Dallas: “as zip code income increased, the number of
holds decreased.”109
Both studies from New Jersey find people with suspended licenses are disproportionately
from urban areas. Carnegie et al. note that “[a]lthough only 43 percent of New Jersey licensed
drivers reside in urban areas, 63 percent of suspended drivers live there.”110 More recent research
similarly reports that 4% of people who had any non-driving related suspensions lived in rural
areas, compared to 5.7% of people with no suspension.111
Racial disparities among drivers with suspended licenses are significant. The Texas
studies referred to earlier, for example, find that in Dallas, Black people account for only 11% of
the driving population and yet account for 28.6% of people who cannot get their licenses
renewed due to OmniBase holds.112 A similar trend is present in Houston, where Black people
make up only 22% of the city population, but comprise 40% of the people with OmniBase
license holds from the Houston Municipal Court.113 Couzier and Garrett’s study of suspensions in
North Carolina finds that Black people make up 21% of drivers and account for 50.5% of license

106

Jon A. Carnegie et al., Driver’s License Suspensions, Impacts and Fairness Study, Nᴇᴡ Jᴇʀsᴇʏ Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ
Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 66 (August 2007).
107
Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and Geographic Variation in Driver’s License Suspensions: Evidence of
Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19 Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 1, 6 (2020).
108
For more specific data on Houston, see Driven by Debt Houston, Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs
Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 5 (July 2020), https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/DrivenByDebt-Houston-July2020.pdf
(“The zip code with the most holds per resident is 77026, an area in Northeast Houston covering the Kashmere
Gardens neighborhood, with 344 holds per every 1,000 residents. This zip code has more than one third of its
residents living below the poverty level and a majority of its residents (52%) are black. The median income is over
$20,000 less than the citywide median income. Profiles of other heavily affected zip codes are similar. The ten zip
codes with the highest rates of holds all have people living in poverty at higher rates than the city’s overall poverty
rate and most have median incomes below the city’s median income. Six of these ten zip codes have a population
that is more than 50% people of color).
109
Driven by Debt Dallas, Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 5 (November 2019),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Driven%20By%20Debt%20Dallas.pdf and Driven by Debt
Houston, Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 4 (July 2020),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/DrivenByDebt-Houston-July2020.pdf.
110
Jon A. Carnegie et al., Driver’s License Suspensions, Impacts and Fairness Study, Nᴇᴡ Jᴇʀsᴇʏ Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ
Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, 66 (August 2007).
111
Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and Geographic Variation in Driver’s License Suspensions: Evidence of
Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19 Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 1, 6 (2020). (also finding that
6.7% of people with driving-related suspensions lived in rural areas)
112
Driven by Debt Dallas, Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 6 (November 2019),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Driven%20By%20Debt%20Dallas.pdf.
113
Driven by Debt Houston, Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 5 (July 2020),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/DrivenByDebt-Houston-July2020.pdf.
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suspensions, whereas white people account for 65% of drivers and 36.3% of license
suspensions.114
Insofar as lost earnings due to suspended licenses is concerned, it is also worthwhile
considering the age of people with a suspended license and the average number of years their
license was suspended. Crozier and Garrett’s North Carolina study finds that the average age of
people at the time of license suspension was 28 years to 29 years, and the average length of hold
ranges from five to ten years.115 Joyce et al.’s study of all New Jersey drivers with a suspended
license from 2004 to 2018 documented an average driver age of 39.4. Most relevant for our
purposes, the reports by the Texas Fair Defense Project and Texas Appleseed report an average
hold length of five years and seven months based on 2018 data acquired from the Department of
Public Safety. A summary of this information is available in Table A.
Table A: Demographic Information About Population With Suspended Driver’s Licenses
Average Length of
Hold

Source of
Estimates

––

5 years and 7 months
(statewide estimate
from 2018 DPS data)

Pages 5-6

New Jersey

39.4 (mean age of
people with any
non-driving related
suspension)

––

Table 1

North
Carolina

28.67 (median age at
time of offense)

10.1 years (median)

Table 2

Study

Jurisdiction

Age

Texas Fair Defense Project
and Texas Appleseed
(2019 and 2020)

Dallas and
Houston

Joyce et al. (2020)

Crouzier and Garrett
(2020)

C. Sizing Texas’s Second Chance Sealing Gap

114

William E. Couzier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License
Suspension in North Carolina, 69 Dᴜᴋᴇ L.J. 1585, 1607-1608 (2020).
115
Driven by Debt Dallas, Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 5-6 (November 2019),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Driven%20By%20Debt%20Dallas.pdf; Driven by Debt Houston,
Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ, 4-5 (July 2020),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/DrivenByDebt-Houston-July2020.pdf; William E. Couzier &
Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69
Dᴜᴋᴇ L.J. 1585, 1607 (2020); Nina R. Joyce et al., Individual and Geographic Variation in Driver’s License
Suspensions: Evidence of Disparities by Race, Ethnicity, and Income, 19 Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ Tʀᴀɴsᴘᴏʀᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Hᴇᴀʟᴛʜ 1, 6
(2020).
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Having provided an overview of Texas’s criminal population, we begin by calculating the
second chance sealing gap — the difference between eligibility and delivery of sealing relief to
people with criminal convictions. We use the gap-sizing methodology described in Chien,
America's Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, Michigan Law Review (2020) to determine
several numbers: (1) the current gap — the number and share of individuals with records that
could qualify for relief, (2) the uptake gap — the share of people eligible for a given second
chance that have obtained it,116 and (3) based on the same data used to calculate the current and
uptake gaps, how many years, at current rates, it would take to clear the existing backlog.
First, we ascertained and modeled Texas’s OND law. Next, we applied the model of the
laws to a sample of criminal histories obtained from the state to identify the number of
individuals eligible for a given second chance. Once we had estimated the number of people
eligible for a given second chance, we calculated the “current gap,” the uptake rate, and the pace
of record relief using the following steps. To estimate the current gap, we divided the number of
people eligible for a given second chance by the number of people in our sample. To estimate the
population eligible for relief, we multiplied the current gap by the total population, which was
estimated using state data. Next, using historical data obtained from the state, we calculated the
estimated relief granted over the past five to ten years by adding the number of second chances
granted to the product of (i) the number of second chances granted in the earliest year of data and
(ii) the number of years left to reach five or ten years of data (whichever was closest to the actual
number of years of data the state provided). Then, to calculate the uptake rate, we divided the
estimated historical relief rate by the number of people eligible for relief plus the estimated
historical relief rate. After calculating the current gap and the uptake gap, we estimated the
number of years it would take to clear the backlog by dividing the population eligible for relief
by the number of people who were granted a second chance in the most recent full year of data.
There are several weaknesses with our methodology. First, we do not account for
eligibility requirements related to fines and fees due to a lack of data, making our eligibility
estimates generous. In the other direction, we also do not include eligibility for expungements of
non-convictions, which depress, potentially dramatically, our estimates of who falls into the
records relief gap. Second, the underlying criminal history provided by the state at times was
missing sentence expiration dates. When that data was missing, we inferred expiration dates
based on data where expiration dates were present.117 Finally, as detailed in the appendix, certain
eligibility provisions contained ambiguities that we were unable to resolve despite multiple
consultations with local criminal law experts. These challenges introduce inaccuracies that cause
our estimates to be both over- and under-inclusive.
Table 2: Estimated Eligibility and Uptake of Texas Record Sealing and Drivers Restoration
Order of Non-Disclosure

Occupational Driver’s

116

Colleen Chien, America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gaps, 119 Mɪᴄʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 519 (2020) at 542-543.
Based on our analysis, we assumed expiration date = sentence_start_date + 2.9 years for misdemeanors and 3.2
years for felonies. Additional details are available in the Appendix.
117
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(Sealing)

License (Restoration)

4,826,860

N/A

Population Eligible for Relief

676,845

438,000

Population Eligible for a Clean Record (no
Conviction)

58,501

N/A

2,650 (2019)

16,350 (2019)

36,409 (10 years)

87,027 (5 years)

Uptake Rate (estimated share of people eligible
for a given second chance that have obtained it)

~5%

~17%

Years It Would Take to Clear the Backlog

255

27

Current Gap (estimated share of all people with
records that are eligible for relief)

14%

N/A

Total Population (Eligible + Ineligible)

Relief Granted in Last Available Year
Estimated Relief Granted

Based on taking the steps described above,118 we estimate that around 677,000 people
with misdemeanor convictions or deferred adjudications are eligible for sealing relief under
Texas Gov. Code Chapter 411, and 59,000 for a clean record. We further find that 18,593 people
had their records sealed between fiscal years 2014 and 2019. Based on this, we project that, at
most, 36,000 people sealed their records over the past ten years. Combining these historical
figures with our eligibility calculations, we estimate that ~5% of people eligible for relief have
received it, leaving 95% of people in the “Texas Second Chance Sealing Gap.” Based on
administrative data, 2,650 people sealed their records in the last year of available data (2019).119
At this rate, it would take 255 years to clear the sealing backlog. The profile of individuals that
could get a “cleaner” or “completely cleaned” record is similar to that of the average profile of a
person with a conviction, except that the average years since the last conviction is 17 and 19
years, respectively.120
D. Sizing Texas’s Second Chance Driver’s License Restoration Gap
We applied a similar “second chance gap” approach to quantifying the number of people
in Texas who appear eligible for but have not received an occupational driver’s license
“restoration” based on Texas Transportation Code Section 521 Subchapter L. Doing so requires
an understanding of how driver’s licenses are suspended in Texas in the first place. Practitioners
have generally described two main, non-driving-related causes of a license suspension: (i) failure

118

Further details are provided in the Appendix.
Data was acquired from the Texas Department of Public Safety. See Appendix E for a breakdown of sealings by
year for every year of data the Department of Public Safety gave us.
120
See Appendix
119
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to pay criminal court-related fines, fees, and surcharges; and (ii) failure to appear (FTA).121 FTAs
in Texas result, in turn, when a person is summoned to court for a range of offenses, ranging
from traffic citations to felonies, but does not appear for their trial or hearing.122 The
consequences can be severe. For instance, failure to appear can result in the issuance of an arrest
warrant.123 Individuals can also lose their driver’s license under Texas Transportation Code 706,
which allows the state to “deny renewal of the driver's license of a person who fails to appear for
a complaint or citation or fails to pay or satisfy a judgment ordering payment of a fine and cost. .
. in a matter involving any [criminal] offense.”124
Using this as a foundation, we focus on people who lost their licenses under the
OmniBase Program, which suspends licenses for failure to pay court-related expenses or failure
to appear.125 We acquired data provided by the Texas Department of Public Safety to ascertain
the number of people that presumably met the “FTA” criteria for ODL relief by virtue of having
a FTA on their driver’s license, which was 438,000 individuals. 126 To complement our analysis,
we relied on statistics from the Department of Public Safety on the number of people who
received an ODL under the OmniBase Program, which reports that 47,449 ODLs were granted
between September 2017 and December 2020.127
There are a few limitations to our approach. First, we were unable to obtain data by
121

See Driven By Debt, Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, (December 13, 2018),
https://report.texasappleseed.org/driven-by-debt/; Driven by Debt: The Failure of the Omnibase Program, Tᴇxᴀs
Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, 3, (August 2021),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/OmniBaseRevenueReport-Aug11-Final.pdf (explaining that
“Holds on license renewals are triggered when license holders either fail to pay fines and costs or fail to appear in
court, usually for traffic offenses. However, eventually all OmniBase Holds are incurred due to an inability to pay,
because the only way to lift a hold is to completely pay off all underlying debt”); Driven by Debt: Dallas, Tᴇxᴀs
Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, 1, (November 2019),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Driven%20By%20Debt%20Dallas.pdf (explaining that “[t]he vast
majority of criminal cases in Texas are fine-only misdemeanors, which are the lowest level of criminal offenses in
Texas and intended to be punished by fines alone and no jail time. Fine-only misdemeanors include most traffic
offenses, city ordinance violations and other Class C misdemeanors such as public intoxication”).
122
Notably, “[m]ost often, people are charged with a fine-only offense when they receive a ticket written by a law
enforcement officer. The ticket instructs them to pay the fine and court costs, or alternatively, to appear in court on
or by a certain date. Only people who cannot pay immediately or want to contest the ticket must show up in court.”
Deborah Fowler et al., Pay Or Stay: The High Cost of Jailing Texans for Fines & Fees, Tᴇxᴀs Aᴘᴘʟᴇsᴇᴇᴅ ᴀɴᴅ Tᴇxᴀs
Fᴀɪʀ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, 7, (February 2017),
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/PayorStay_Report_final_Feb2017.pdf.
123
Id., 7-8.
124
Texas Transportation Code, Chapter 706.
125
Failure to Appear/Failure to Pay Program, Tᴇxᴀs Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ, (last viewed January 22, 2022),
https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/failure-appearfailure-pay-program. See also Texas Transportation
Code, Chapter 706.
126
Email from Texas Department of Public Safety to Texas Fair Defense Project. Email is on file with authors. [for
editors: https://cloudhq.net/s/e398c60edff3f1]
127
See Driver License Division High Value Set, Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ (February 2020, January 2020,
December 2019, November 2019, October 2019, September 2019, August 2019, July 2019, June 2019, May 2019,
April 2019, March 2019, February 2019, January 2019, December 2018, November 2018, October 2018, September
2018, August 2018, July 2018, June 2018, May 2018, April 2018, March 2018, February 2018, January 2018,
December 2017, November 2017, October 2017, September 2017) (all reports as of January 21, 2022 available at
https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/driver-license-division-high-value-data-sets).
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which we could determine the bases for license suspension and so therefore could not model the
“inability to pay” criteria. We excluded people qualifying for occupational licenses based on this
criteria from our estimate, depressing it. That being said, we note that there is likely substantial
overlap between the universe of individuals who qualify under each criteria, particularly because
a major cause of a FTA is lack of transportation to attend one’s hearing. 128 Second, we do not
model the requirement for receiving an ODL of having driver’s insurance as required in the
court. In operation, this requirement is likely to act as a significant hurdle to ODL restoration by
the subset of people with FTAs whose FTAs are based on poverty.129 Additionally, although
individuals with FTAs are unlikely to have the traits in general which would disqualify them for
ODL relief, 130 it remains the case that “a small percentage [of the people who have an FTA] may
have other suspensions that make them ineligible for an ODL, such as [that their license was]
also revoked for a medical reason, a hard suspension/waiting period because of an alcohol or
drug offense, or their driver license is revoked because of non-payment of child support.”131
Once again, these methodological weaknesses cause us to both underestimate and overestimate
the second chance gap.
Based on the methods, data sources, and caveats described above and further elaborated
in the Appendix, we estimate that around 438,000 people with suspended licenses due to FTA are
eligible for an ODL under Texas Transportation Code Section 521 Subchapter L. Using the data
sources described above, we project that the Texas Department of Public Safety granted 87,027
ODLs over the past five years. Combining these historical ODL figures with our eligibility
calculations, we estimate that 16.58% of people eligible for relief have received it, leaving 83.2%
of people in the “Texas Second Chance Driving Relicensing Gap.” Based on reported records,
the State granted 16,350 ODLs in the last year of fully available data (2019). At this rate, it
would take nearly three decades (27 years) to clear the ODL backlog.
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https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/PayorStay_Report_final_Feb2017.pdf. See also Driven by Debt:
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https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/PayorStay_Report_final_Feb2017.pdf.
130
For example, on the basis of hard suspension waiting periods due to DWIs, which are Class B misdemeanors or
more serious offenses. See Know Your Rights: Traffic Tickets and Other Class C Misdemeanors, ACLU Tᴇxᴀs, (last
visited August 26, 2021),
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PART III: ESTIMATING THE ANNUAL EARNINGS IMPACTS OF A CRIMINAL
CONVICTION AND LOST DRIVER’S LICENSE AND THE EARNING IMPACTS OF
TEXAS’ SECOND CHANCE GAPS
25
A. Summary of Results
Employment and earning opportunities are limited for persons who have criminal records
or who lack driver’s licenses, compared to those without such restrictions. Though second
chance laws make it possible to remove these barriers to work through records sealing or license
restoration, our analysis of Texas’s criminal justice system in the previous part finds that only a
fraction of those apparently eligible for relief are accessing it, with over a million people falling
into either the second chance sealing or occupational driver’s license gap. While second chance
reforms are often generally motivated by a desire to expand economic opportunity, no study of
which we are aware has yet attempted to specify the cost to society, in aggregate earnings and
employment losses, associated with the “second chance gap.” The following paragraphs detail
our attempts to do so, with the results of our analysis shown in Table 2, below.
Table 3: The Size and Annual Earnings Losses Associated with Texas’s Second
Chance Sealing and Driver’s License Gaps
Orders of Non-Disclosure

Drivers License Restoration

National Estimate of Annual Wage
Loss
$5,100

National Estimate of Annual
Wage Loss (lower bounds
estimate)

$12,696

People estimated in the second
chance ODL gap (total clearance)

Estimate of Annual Wage Loss
(upper bounds estimate)

$23,552

676,845

People estimated in the second
chance ODL gap (total clearance) 438,000
Estimate of Annual Earnings Loss

Estimate of Annual Earnings Loss
$3,451,909,500 (lower bounds)
$5,560,848,000
Estimate of Annual Earnings Loss
(upper bounds)
$10,315,776,000

B. Estimating The Earnings Effect of Incarceration and Conviction
A great deal of empirical work on the impact of contact with the criminal legal system on
employment and earnings is limited to incarceration, although a growing body of studies is
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beginning to push the point of contact up to conviction and even arrest.132 There are challenges
with these kinds of studies, namely, adjusting for the distinct possibility that individuals who
have contact with the criminal legal system would experience employment problems or wage
erosion even in the absence of that contact. This is known as the selection problem, and it is
exemplified by socioeconomic profiles indicating that individuals who have contact with the
criminal legal system tend to be drawn from lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. For
example, Harlow reports that just 32% of state prison inmates have a high school diploma,
compared to 82% of the general population.133 It is for this reason that Wakefield and Uggen
characterize the criminal legal system partly as a social filter that absorbs marginal and
marginalized populations.134 Furthermore, individuals who experience more punitive forms of
contact with the criminal legal system (e.g., conviction with incarceration as opposed to
conviction with probation) tend to have even more disadvantaged profiles.135 This would seem to
call into question whether employment difficulty could be interpreted as the causal effect of
contact with the criminal legal system experience, or else a spurious artifact. Despite that
challenge, many studies have taken great care to deal with the selection problem using several
kinds of quasi-experimental designs. There are many such studies that currently exist, but we
focus our attention on the few that are directly relevant for our purpose.
Studies of large national surveys in the U.S. consistently indicate incarceration, even a
very short spell of confinement, is highly disruptive for an individual’s employment prospects.
Apel and Ramakers review many of them and conclude that formerly incarcerated individuals
have a 10-20% lower likelihood of employment than their non-incarcerated peers.136 This means
that if the baseline employment-to-population ratio is 60%, individuals who have been
incarcerated have a comparable ratio of 48-54%.137 Among individuals who are employed,
moreover, the wage gap tends to be on the order of 5-30%, meaning when judged against a
baseline wage of $10 per hour, otherwise similar but formerly incarcerated individuals who find
employment earn $7 - $9.50 per hour.138 Assuming a 40-hour work week, this would amount to a
penalty of $1,040 to $6,240 per year, compared to an annual baseline of $20,800.139
132

For instance, see Robert Apel & Kathleen Powell, Level of Criminal Justice Contact and Early Adult Wage
Inequality, 5 Rᴜssᴇʟʟ Sᴀɢᴇ Fᴏᴜɴᴅᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟ Sᴄɪᴇɴᴄᴇs 198, 199-200 (January 2019) (presenting a
literature review about key studies related to lost earnings and criminal justice contact, and noting “[t]his rich
research tradition is mixed with respect to legal jurisdictions, types of contact, age and representativeness of the
samples, measurement sources, research designs, and methodological rigor”).
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Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations (NCJ 195670), Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ ᴏғ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ Sᴛᴀᴛɪsᴛɪᴄs
(January 2003), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf.
134
Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, 36 Incarceration and Stratification, Aɴɴᴜᴀʟ Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ ᴏғ Sᴏᴄɪᴏʟᴏɢʏ 387
(2010).
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Id., 389-393. See also Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: A Manual for Policymakers and
Practitioners, Tʜᴇ Sᴇɴᴛᴇɴᴄɪɴɢ Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ (2008) (discussing causes of racial disparity in the criminal justice system,
how these disparities manifest, and what practitioners and policymakers can do to address these disparities).
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Robert Apel & Anke Ramakers, Impact of incarceration on employment prospects, 85-104, in Hᴀɴᴅʙᴏᴏᴋ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ
Cᴏɴsᴇᴏ̨ᴜᴇɴᴄᴇs ᴏғ Sᴇɴᴛᴇɴᴄɪɴɢ ᴀɴᴅ Pᴜɴɪsʜᴍᴇɴᴛ Dᴇᴄɪsɪᴏɴs (Beth M. Huebner & Natasha A. Frost, eds., 2019).
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The “disruption” effect of incarceration is distinct from, but in many cases, further
compounded by, the “marking” effect of having a criminal record, and, in particular, a
conviction, on earnings and employment. Craigie and her coauthors provide the most recent
estimates of the impact of misdemeanor and felony conviction and incarceration on earnings,
which we use as a starting point.140 They rely on self-reported criminal justice contact in a large,
representative, and longitudinal sample of individuals who were in their 30s the last time they
were interviewed.141 Their design entails matching individuals who experienced criminal justice
contact to their peers who share the same demographic profile and regional economic
characteristics, but who did not experience criminal justice contact.142 They estimate lost annual
earnings due to misdemeanor convictions to be $5,100, which is a 16% difference relative to
baseline annual earnings of $32,000, and lost earnings from a felony conviction to be $6,400 (a
22% decline relative to baseline of $29,400).143 These represent the effects of misdemeanor and
felony conviction relative to no conviction, the latter mostly reflecting no criminal justice
contact, although it could include some number of individuals who experienced forms of
criminal justice processing that did not culminate in a conviction (e.g., arrest, booking). Slightly
larger are the lost earnings from incarceration, which the authors estimate to be $7,100 per year
(a 52% decline relative to baseline of $13,800).144 This estimate compares individuals who
experienced any post-conviction sentence of incarceration to individuals who did not experience
criminal justice contact as well as individuals who might have experienced other forms of
criminal justice processing (possibly even those held in jail awaiting processing) but were not
sentenced to incarceration.145
The evidence that is most relevant for our purpose comes from Harris County, Texas.
Mueller-Smith takes advantage of the fact that misdemeanor and felony defendants are randomly
assigned to a courtroom, which determines both the judge that presides over their case as well as
the prosecution team.146 Because randomization ensures there is no systematic tendency for
defendants with certain characteristics to be assigned to a particular courtroom, variation in
incarceration arises solely from the assigned courtroom. In that sense, variation in punishment
due to the preferential leanings of individual judges can be thought of as being as good as
randomly assigned. The analysis merges administrative data from law enforcement, the court, the
correctional system, and the labor department to pool together individuals who are incarcerated
for the first time with individuals who have prior incarceration spells, and to compare them to
those who could have been incarcerated but were not because they were randomly assigned to a
140

Terry-Anne Craigie et al., Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the Criminal
Justice System Deepens Inequality, Bʀᴇɴɴᴀɴ Cᴇɴᴛᴇʀ ғᴏʀ Jᴜsᴛɪᴄᴇ, (September 15, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/conviction-imprisonment-and-lost-earnings-how-involve
ment-criminal.
141
Id., 31-32.
142
Id., 31-33.
143
Id., 15.
144
Id., 17.
145
Id., 17-19.
146
Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration, Unpublished manuscript,
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less punitive courtroom.147 Mueller-Smith estimates that, during incarceration, individuals
sentenced for misdemeanors and felonies are less likely to be employed by more than 30
percentage points.148 Following incarceration, their quarterly employment probability remains
lower by 4-5 percentage points, and their quarterly earnings are lower by 30-40% relative to their
peers who were not incarcerated.149 In terms of lost earnings, he estimates the annual earnings
gap to be $1,864 due to incarceration for a misdemeanor and $4,706 due to a two-year
incarceration spell for a felony.150 As a further sign of their difficulty in attaining financial
self-sufficiency following incarceration, formerly incarcerated individuals rely more heavily on
government programs (e.g., food stamps, cash welfare, etc.) after their release.151
A more recent study by Mueller-Smith and Schnepel focuses on two policy changes in
Harris County related to court use of diversion for certain groups of criminal defendants — one
in 1994 that reduced the use of diversion (for certain property and drug defendants) and another
in 2007 that expanded the use of diversion (for certain low-risk defendants).152 In this study,
diversion refers to deferred adjudication of guilt, whereby defendants evade a felony conviction
by completing a period of community supervision.153 This type of sanction is akin to probation,
but whereas probation is an alternative to prison that follows a formal conviction for low-level
offenses, deferred adjudication avoids a conviction outright. The study speaks directly to the
impact on employment of a felony conviction record, since the marginal defendant is one who is
most likely to be sentenced to community supervision, meaning the only difference is whether
they acquire a felony conviction in the process.154 Their analysis takes advantage of the fact that
these two deferred adjudication policies were implemented abruptly—abrupt changes like this
are frequently referred to as natural experiments, because they allow comparison of individuals
who would have received the same sanction but for the policy change, and who instead receive
different sanctions that are arguably as good as being randomly assigned.155 The authors estimate
that individuals who benefit from deferred adjudication have a higher quarterly employment
likelihood by at least 15 percentage points (an almost 50% increase over baseline in both
years).156 They also have substantially higher total earnings — the authors estimate the average
annual earnings loss from a felony conviction to be as high as $8,500 (1994) and at least $4,100
(2007).157 These employment and earnings effects are long lasting, as they persist for 10 years
after deferred adjudication and, after the 1994 change, for an astonishing 20 years.158
147
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In light of their careful design, these two Harris County studies provide credible estimates
of the causal impact of incarceration and conviction, respectively, on employment and earnings.
What is notable about both studies is that, not only do conviction and incarceration worsen shortand long-term employment and earnings prospects, but they also increase the likelihood of
further entanglement with the criminal legal system. This seems to be especially likely among
individuals with no prior felony convictions, for whom the impacts of a felony conviction on
recidivism and employment are largest.159 This implies the state of Texas pays not only in terms
of lost wage-related revenue but also in the cost of additional crime and legal processing as well
as the cost of government programs from which justice-impacted individuals seek relief.
Table B provided a summary of the estimates of different forms of criminal justice
sanctions on annual earnings, obtained from the studies described above. The estimates are
comparable even though they derive from different samples and different quasi-experimental
designs. Our particular interest is in lost earnings from conviction, estimates of which are broken
down by misdemeanor and felony conviction.
Table B. Estimates of Lost Annual Earnings from Conviction and Incarceration

Study

Jurisdiction

Impact of Conviction

Impact of Incarceration

Source of
Estimate

Craigie et al. (2020)

National

Misdemeanor: $5,100

$7,100

Table 3

Misdemeanor: $1,864

Table 7

Felony: $6,400
Mueller-Smith
(2015)

Harris County, TX

Mueller-Smith and
Schnepel (2021)

Harris County, TX

---

Felony: $4,786
Felony (1994): $8,536

Table 4

Felony (2007): $4,144

Note: The felony incarceration estimate in Mueller-Smith (2015) assumes a two-year sentence of incarceration, as
he allows the impact to differ by duration of sentence. The estimates from Mueller-Smith and Schnepel (2021) relate
to deferred adjudication policy reforms, through which individuals are able to avoid a conviction record by
completing community supervision.

C. Estimating the Earnings Impact of the Texas Second Chance Expungement (Sealing) Gap
We specifically use the estimates from Craigie et al., since this is the only study to
estimate the impact of both misdemeanor and felony conviction, and since its estimate of
earnings loss from a felony conviction is the midpoint of the two estimates provided by
Mueller-Smith and Schnepel. This leads us to conclude the national average impact of a
159
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misdemeanor conviction on earnings is about $5,100 per year, and the impact of a felony
conviction is about $6,400 per year. Although the Mueller-Smith study relies on a control group
that includes not only first-time but also additional convictions, because studies indicate that the
binary step, of going from having to not having a conviction record, or vice versa, is most
significant, we conservatively include in our calculation only people who would be able to seal
their records entirely of convictions, a smaller number than who could receive any relief under
sealing law. It is important to note that these studies, and our figures, are drawn from national
calculations that may not accurately predict the outcomes of Texans with convictions.160 Thus,
though we use the estimates above to carry out our exercise, we heavily caveat its precise total
for at least this reason.
Multiplying the number of individuals that could entirely clear their records, 58,501, by
$5,100 yields a conservative estimate of approximately $300 million annually in lost earnings. If
we change our estimate to include all in our sample who could get sealing relief (676,845), an
approach that is consistent with the Mueller-Smith and Schnepel research design of comparing
people with various records who received deferred adjudications with those who did not, the
cumulative annual earnings loss balloons to approximately $3.5 billion. These figures represent
forgone earnings due to having one additional criminal conviction relative to no criminal
conviction — in economic parlance, it represents lost earnings on the extensive margin.
One might wonder whether these wages are permanently lost, in light of evidence that a
criminal record stigmatizes individuals in the labor market, and sustained time out of the labor
market erodes human capital even further. This suggests that initial demand-side barriers to work
have the capacity to become self-sustaining as they crystallize into experience gaps that make it
even more difficult to secure gainful employment. With respect to the latter possibility, surveys
of employers indicate they are less likely to want to hire individuals with a “spotty work record”
as opposed to individuals with only a GED, and even compared to individuals who have been
unemployed for a year or more.161 Although employers are least likely to want to hire someone
with a criminal record, then, criminal record expungement might not suffice to fully recover lost
earnings, since experience gaps that accumulate over time because of the criminal record cannot
be fully remedied.
Even if some employment erosion is permanent, there are compelling reasons to believe
that expungement policy can lead to the recovery of some fraction of lost earnings. This is
especially likely to be the case for lost earnings that are due to, for example, restrictions on
occupational licensing for individuals with a conviction record, employer refusals to interview or
hire individuals who have a conviction record (either by requiring it on a job application or via
background check), or employer channeling of individuals with conviction records into
lower-paying positions. One relevant finding from the Mueller-Smith and Schnepel study is that
individuals who benefitted from deferred adjudication were more likely to find work in
industries that were otherwise closed off to individuals with conviction records (e.g., retail trade,
160
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health care, educational services).162 Additional evidence comes from the immediate employment
and wage gains that accrue to individuals with a criminal record who obtain expungement.163
These findings suggest some amount of lost earnings because of employer stigma and legal
barriers are indeed recoverable.
D. The Earnings Effect of a Suspended Driver’s License
The research base on the economic impact of driver’s license suspension is less well
developed, but we wish to draw attention to this work despite its provisional status. A study of
driver history records in New Jersey found, remarkably, just 10% of license suspension orders
were for driving-related behavior that could be construed as a road safety concern (e.g., driving
under the influence, points accumulation from moving violations, uninsured driving, reckless
driving, etc.).164 The lion’s share of suspensions was either for financial reasons (40%, e.g.,
failure to pay motor vehicle authority surcharge, comply with a court-ordered installment plan, or
pay child support) or for non-appearance in court to satisfy a summons (32%).165 In the same
study, a survey of drivers with suspended licenses sought to understand the collateral effects of
license suspension. Among more than 300 respondents, 40% reported they were unable to keep
their job after their suspension, with low-income individuals far more likely to suffer job loss
(64% of those with income under $30,000).166 Almost one-fifth (17%) of the sample reported not
only losing their job but also being unable to find a new one (or 32% of low-income
respondents).167 Among those who were able to find another job, almost all reported negative
effects on their income, but regrettably, the estimated amount of lost income was not included in
the survey.168 In a separate study, Pawasara and Quinn assessed the impact of having a valid
driver’s license among welfare recipients as part of the administration of a training program
carried out in Milwaukee.169 They report that among program participants with less than 12 years
of education, individuals with a valid driver's license were “four times more likely to show
earnings above the poverty level, compared to those without a current license.”170
The single study we found that attempted to specifically quantify the impact on earnings
of lacking a license was of the city of Phoenix’s “Compliance Assistance Program (CAP),”
162
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which for a period of time reinstated driving privileges of individuals with civil traffic violations
and unpaid fines and fees.171 The program restored licenses along with waiving some fees in
exchange for enrolling in a payment plan. From in-person and mail surveys of 75 program
enrollees, 31% of those who were employed reported losing their job as a direct consequence of
their suspended license, and 57% reported working fewer hours. Across the sample, the median
income loss was estimated at $36,800 (with a range of $1,200 to $300,000).172
The estimates provided here should be regarded as descriptive and therefore highly
provisional. We rely on the Phoenix study to estimate the impact of license suspension on
income, and although some of the needed information is not provided in the study, it is the only
study to date that attempts to quantify income loss. Because the sample comprises individuals
who enrolled in the CAP program, they might have been especially motivated to do so because
of job difficulty.173 Acknowledging these and other limitations, we take at face value the estimate
of lost annual income for the typical (median) person with a suspended license to be $36,800, but
scale this downward to account for individuals who were not working or whose work was not
disrupted by suspension. We note that 36% of the sample was not working at the time of license
suspension, and among the workers, we estimate that 72% experienced disruption (either because
of job loss [31%] or reduction in hours [57%], with 72% representing our effort to adjust for
double counting).174 Using this information, we conservatively estimate that license suspension
results in about $12,700 in lost annual earnings.175 Multiplying this by the number of people
eligible for an occupational driver’s license (438,000), yields an estimate of around $5.5 billion
in lost earnings yearly due to not having a driver’s license.176
While further research is certainly needed, recent qualitative studies and accounts of
“unlicensing” support an impact on earnings that is at least as large, if not larger, than the
estimate we report above. Job loss and job disqualification, and lower-wage job options, appear
to be the main mechanisms. For example, through semi-structured phone interviews conducted in
2020 and 2021, Sartin and her co-authors found suspended license “employment challenges” to
present in several ways: directly, by preventing subjects from applying for the numerous jobs
that mandated licenses, on or off-the job, and indirectly, in terms of the type of work and level of
171
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pay available to persons without licenses.177 Dindial and her co-authors, also interviewing
subjects across states, concluded that suspended licenses “creat[ed] obstacles to finding or
keeping paid work.”178 Jobs unavailable to people without licenses include driving for Uber/Lyft
and delivery and driving-related jobs, automobile sales and services, home healthcare aides, and
the construction trade.179 Positions including retail security officer (pay: $10.55 an hour), a
caregiver for the disabled ($10 an hour), an eye-care associate, an administrative assistant, and a
deli clerk have also been reported to require a license.180 Studies show that employers also use
licenses as screens181 or positive signal: “positions use a driver’s license as a proxy for whether
you’re employable.”182
In Texas, 20.8% of civilian jobs in 2016 required driving a passenger vehicle.183 The
state’s size and infrastructure have meant that 80% (+/- 0.2) of workers in Texas at least 16 years
old drove alone (i.e., did not carpool or rideshare) to work in 2016.184 When a license is
reinstated, it can quickly translate into an earnings opportunity as the experience of 47-year old
John Blackwell illustrates.185 Once Blackwell got his license back, Blackwell, who works as a
carpenter foreman, “c[ould] make an additional $2 an hour [with the ability to]. . . drive a
company truck.”186 Assuming that Blackwell works 40 hours per week, the extra $2 per hour
adds up to an extra $4,480 in wages per year.187
E. Comparing the Cumulative Earnings Effect of Texas’s Paper Prisons with the
Out-of-Pocket Cost of Texas’s Physical Prisons
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Aggregating the most conservative estimates of lost earnings associated with the second
chance sealing and second chance relicensing gaps described above yields a total that ranges
from $5.6 billion (assuming complete overlap) to $6 billion (assuming no overlap). By way of
comparison the entire 2022 operating budget for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice was
$3.7 billion.188
Taken at face value, these calculations would suggest that the cost of Texas’s “paper
prisons,” in terms of lost earnings, is as large as if not larger than the out-of-pocket cost of its
physical prisons. Provided for purposes of illustration, they suggest that, although often
motivated by considerations of fairness, second chance rules have significant and overlooked
earnings and employment consequences.
PART IV: AUTOMATION AND POLICY PILOTS
The previous part considered the order of magnitude effects, in terms of lost earnings,
associated with the failed delivery of second chances in Texas. What this exercise underscores is
not only the large number of people for whom second chances appear to have largely been
missed chances, but also, the large economic and earnings impact associated with the second
chance gap, and potential to reverse, at least partially, these economic losses with policies that
close the gaps. Ways to both narrow the second chance gap and the gap in understanding its
economic impact, are discussed in this part. We start by considering the drivers of Texas’s second
chance gaps, then the reforms that could narrow them. We recommend the use of policy pilots to
both introduce policy interventions and provide the research infrastructure for observing their
outcomes.
A. Drivers of Texas’s Second Chance Gaps
Why don’t more people seek to clear their criminal convictions or reinstate their lost
driver’s licenses, given their negative impact on earnings and employment? The processes of
obtaining relief presented in Section I confirm a number of the same barriers to relief
documented by others, including lack of awareness, unclear criteria, burdensome application
processes, and fines and fees189 to impede uptake of the relief offered in Texas.
Texas law puts the impetus on the individual to initiate the process or relief-seeking
through a petition. But in many cases, there is a lack of awareness about the second chances to
which one may be entitled. The awareness gap is particularly acute when a second chance
opportunity is first introduced, or changes are made to its eligibility. There is typically no
specific advertising or communications budget allocated for alerting eligible citizens that they
can apply for relief — indeed, to specify such a budget would likely reduce the chances of
enactment in a climate of fiscal austerity. This is a problem particularly in the case of records
188
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relief provisions, which are often updated frequently. Since record sealing was introduced in
2003, legislative acts in 2015 and 2017 have changed who is eligible, making it difficult for even
the diligent to know when and if the law may apply to them. Similarly, very few people are
aware that ODLs are an option that would allow them to drive to work or take care of other
essential tasks.190 As one report stated, “most people with. . . [driver’s license] holds do not know
that ODLs are an option and do not apply for them.”191 Even for those that are aware, the process
of applying for an ODL has been described as “labyrinthine. . . just determining which court to
file in can be impossible for many people to figure out on their own.”192 Insufficient information
about how to reinstate licenses has also been cited as a barrier to application in a number of
states with programs similar to Texas.’193
Ambiguous or undefined criteria194 and discretion-based processes also contribute to the
gap. They discourage uptake because they make the payoff from the application process
uncertain. This is particularly a problem because of the costly, burdensome, and informationally
intensive processes described in Part I. As one of us has previously written, “[i]n the same way
that the accused remain innocent until proven guilty in the U.S. criminal justice system, many
190
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second chance programs require defendants to ‘prove’ that they deserve second chances before
awarding them. As such, getting one’s second chance through petition-based processes may
include enduring a bureaucratic and expensive process, amassing information through a variety
of sources, and being evaluated by an adjudicative or administrative body.”195
Petition filing fees196 as well as the requirement to satisfy unpaid fines, fees, and
surcharges also present substantial barriers. Indeed, the requirement that fines and fees be paid
off may be the most important barrier to relief to restored driver’s licenses. One prime example
of this is the OmniBase Program, which has no fee-waiving mechanism.197 “OmniBase holds
aren’t lifted even when somebody appears in court and gets on a payment plan or begins
assigned community service. The only way to lift a hold is to satisfy the fines and costs in
full.”198 This lack of fee-waiving mechanism is critical because “[m]ore than one in four
OmniBase holds between 2013 and 2017 were a result of poverty-related offenses such as
driving without insurance, displaying expired license plates, driving with an invalid license, or
no driver’s license at all.”199
B. Narrowing Texas’s Second Chance Gaps
The most impactful way to improve the administration of second chances would be to
eliminate fines and fees requirements, as other states have done,200 and to streamline delivery
through automation. Due to different administrative aspects of the laws, automation would look
195
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slightly different for each type of second chance. For instance, automatically sealing records
would ideally follow the Clean Slate model, which uses computer queries to identify eligible
individuals and then automatically seals those people’s records. A similar program could
automatically look at whether individuals meet the ODL eligibility criteria and invite eligible
individuals to apply.
Automation makes the application process less burdensome in four ways. First,
automation would reduce the awareness gap for individuals seeking second chances because it
would not only identify eligible individuals, but also either (i) invite individuals eligible for relief
to apply, or (ii) provide relief to eligible individuals. Second, automation makes it so that people
seeking to seal their records do not need to complete a petition, thereby “streamlin[ing]
petition-based record clearing— a costly and time-intensive process that prevents the vast
majority of eligible people from ever obtaining needed relief.”201 Third, automation could reduce
the number of individuals who need an attorney to help them navigate complicated application
processes. Fourth, automation, coupled with the elimination of fines and fees, would remove the
financial obstacles to getting a second chance. Notably, however, the reduction of fines and fees
would apply only to record sealing, at least based on the policy changes this article proposes. As
such, the driver’s relicensing gap might remain large until policymakers find a way to either (i)
make fee waivers more accessible, or (ii) eliminate filing fees.
There are at least three types of concerns that relate to automating second chances. One is
that developing the systems needed to identify and notify eligible individuals requires time,
money, and oversight.202 Although it is true that Texas will need to invest in technology to
automate second chances, it is worth remembering that we roughly estimate that Texans lose up
to $3.5 billion annually in lost earnings, and associated tax revenue, just from the second chance
sealing gap. This may be why a financial report for H.B. 3601, a proposed clean slate bill from
the 87th Legislature, reported that “[n]o significant fiscal implication to the State is
anticipated.”203 Indeed, the tax revenue associated with higher earnings would be expected to
save the state money in the long run.
The second concern about automating second chances is that automating the current law
cannot actually be done effectively due to the unclear criteria and data deficiencies highlighted
earlier in this article. For instance, some scholars express concern that automating expunctions
201
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might not be realistic in Texas, “where expunctions cannot be granted until the statute of
limitations has passed. Statutes of limitation vary by crime and class of crime, and keeping track
of their expiration would put a significant burden on counties, which would most likely be
responsible for processing the automatic expunctions. Additionally, assuming an ‘automatic
expunction’ [or automatic sealing] bill is retroactive, it would be extremely time-consuming for
counties to look back into their old records, determine what can be expunged, and go through the
expunction process.”204 So concerns are likely true for record sealing and ODLs. However, we
note that although automating second chances “would require significant data normalization and
cleaning efforts,”205 reforming the law to make it implementable at scale can provide a path
forward. To illustrate, we discuss clearance criteria challenges and legislative drafting
alternatives to overcome these challenges in Appendix F. This could serve as a foundation for
starting to adjust Texas’ laws to the reality of Texas’ data.
The third concern is more general, about the effectiveness of records relief as a way to
achieve the policy aims of public safety, job growth, and equity. The potential harms of statistical
discrimination replacing records-based exclusion, a lack of knowledge of sealed records
rendering the policy impactless, and the risk of automating relatively minor crimes intensifying
the earnings penalty for people with more significant records have all been previously raised.206
C. Narrowing Knowledge Gaps about the Earnings Impact of Sealing and Driver’s
License Restoration
The introduction of an intervention to narrow the second chance gap at the county or state
level presents a chance not only to narrow the second chance gap, but also to narrow the
knowledge gap about the associated earnings impact. Policy pilots, which temporarily change a
law or policy so lawmakers and scholars can learn from it,207 can provide an excellent way to
overcome “the knowledge gap and risk aversion in policy development.”208
There are at least two ways that policy pilots could improve the delivery of second
chances. First, carrying out an automation trial could help lawmakers identify ambiguity in the
existing statute and pinpoint how it needs to be adjusted to support records clearance at scale.
Second, policy pilots could be used to study the impact on earnings of newly available second
chance relief, for example, in order to carry out the cost-benefit to the state of such a policy.
Such policy pilots would not only provide valuable information about the true cost of Texas’s
second chance gaps, but would also provide lawmakers with additional information to ensure
that they pursue cost-effective policy solutions.
204
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The best prospect would be for a study conducted at the individual level, involving
matching of administrative records from multiple agencies. This might include the state law
enforcement agency that maintains a criminal history repository with arrests and charges and
local and county courts that retain data on convictions and sentences along with non-penal
sanctions such as fines and fees. Other relevant agencies include the state motor vehicle authority
with data on license suspensions and traffic violations and state labor and welfare agencies that
collect data on earnings and transfer payments. To ensure that the impact of closing a second
chance gap can be discerned using experimental or quasi-experimental methods, local policy labs
such as the Texas Policy Lab at Rice University or the Texas Public Policy Foundation think tank
could be appointed to consult on the policy’s roll-out.209 Upstream attention to implementation
will support downstream learning about interventions to boost the workforce.
CONCLUSION
This article provides an estimate of the annual earnings loss associated with a conviction,
finding it to be on the order of $5,100 to $6,400 per year, as well as a provisional estimate of the
annual earnings loss associated with a suspended driver’s license, conservatively estimating it to
be approximately $12,700. Using Texas as a case study, it quantifies the size of the state’s second
chance sealing and occupational driver’s license gaps, estimating that around 670,000 Texans
could seal their misdemeanor convictions and about 438,000 Texans are eligible for ODLs.
Mechanically aggregating these figures results in a earning loss estimate of $3.5 billion in
connection with the second chance sealing gap and $5.5 billion from the second chance ODL gap
in Texas, in comparison with the operating budget of Texas's correctional system of $3.6 billion.
This suggests not only that the costs of paper prisons could exceed the cost of physical prisons,
but also that closing paper prisons, through automation, can have fiscal benefits that resemble or
far exceed closing physical prisons, although rigorous evaluation and research are needed to see
whether this is the case.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: RULES
To estimate the number and share of people eligible for but not receiving sealing,
compassionate release, and driver’s license restoration in Texas, we used the Methodology
established in Section II. For more information about our approach, please see Colleen V. Chien,
America's Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, Michigan Law Review (2020).
1. Sizing the Texas Sealing Second Chance Gap
To estimate the number of Texans eligible for records sealing, we focused narrowly on
the subset of people that could, if eligibility criteria were automatically applied to them,
transition from having a misdemeanor conviction or deferred adjudication to not having a
conviction or deferred adjudication under Texas Gov. Code Chap. 411. To conduct our analysis,
we acquired the CCH from the Texas Department of Public Safety.210 To support our analysis of
the uptake rate of sealing, the DPS also sent us administrative data containing historical
information about the number of people who had their records sealed annually.
We imported and then inner joined the data to create unique person IDs for each person.
Once we had created unique IDs, we randomly selected 153,674 individuals for our sample. To
make sure our data was consistent, we removed about forty individuals whose sentence
expiration dates were earlier than their sentence start dates, leaving us with a random sample of
153,632 individuals. We then turned to cleaning the data, focusing first on categorizing
disposition data.211 Likewise, we categorized the following dispositions as non-convictions: not
guilty, dismissed, mistrial, abandoned charges, waived, acquitted, community supervision
expired, deferred, unadjudicated with, dead, pending, dismissed, dismissed – mentally
incompetent, and pending – mental incompetence. After categorizing the dispositions, we turned
to cleaning the sentencing data. Though 2,041,483 records in our sample had sentence
completion data, for 554,444 records, the data was missing. Rather than exclude these records
from our analysis, we instead calculated, from the cases where the data was present, the average
lag between sentencing and sentence completion and added these numbers (2.9 years after the
date of sentencing and 3.2 years for misdemeanors and felonies, respectively), and used this to
roughly estimate sentence completion dates.
To be conservative in our estimates about the number of individuals eligible for record
sealing, we made a number of assumptions when conducting our analysis. First, since we could
210

The Criminalized Computer History (CCH) More information about the CCH is available at Texas Department
of Public Safety, About CCH, (last visited August 20, 2021),
https://publicsite.dps.texas.gov/DpsWebsite/CriminalHistory/AboutCch.aspx.

Based on consultation with criminal law experts, we categorized the following dispositions as
convictions: convicted, multiple charges, commuted, amend probation, convicted – appeal
pending, pardoned, probation discharge, probation revocation, sentence modified, convicted lesser charge, and mistrial.
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not easily determine whether offenses were of a violent or sexual nature, we manually determine
whether fourteen offenses would be ineligible due to being offenses of a violent or sexual
nature.212 When in doubt after reading the statutes associated with these fourteen offenses, we
assumed that they were ineligible to be conservative in our estimates.213 Second, we assume that
offenses that appeared in the data as misdemeanors but had a statute indicating an enhancement
to a state jail felony or a felony were ineligible.214 Third, if someone has ever been convicted of
an offense listed in Tex. Gov. Code 411.074(b), that person cannot have any of the offenses on
their record sealed. Most of those offenses were easy to model, but some depended on facts of
the case that we did not have access to. In these cases, we assumed that anyone convicted of
these offenses were ineligible.215 Finally, we assumed that someone was incarcerated if the
number of days between the disposition date and the sentence expiration date was greater than
two years.216 When the data contains both sentence expiration date and a parole date for the same
person and offense, we assume that any sentence expiration date that is greater than the parole
until date indicates time in prison.
Despite our efforts to be conservative, there is a further noteworthy limitation to our
analysis. While we only model sealing for adults, the sealing data that we acquired from the
Department of Public Safety includes the aggregate number of sealings for juveniles and adults.
As such, it is likely that we overestimate the pace of relief provided under the current,
application-based method, and overestimate the uptake rate and underestimate the current gap.
RULES217*
Orders of Non-Disclosure and Expunction
Primary Sources: Texas Gov. Code Chap. 411 (2017) | Sec. 411.072 | 411.0725 | 411.073 |
411.0731 | 411.0735 | 411.074 (all 2017) | Art. 55.01(2019)
Secondary Sources: University of Texas Guide (2019) | Texas CCRC (12/3/2021) | App | Texas
Law Help OND Prep Guide
A. CONVICTIONS
212

Although we did our best with the data cleaning, it is always worth noting that the dirty nature of the data could
have impacted our findings and is thus a weakness. Also, when identifying whether convictions were of a violent or
sexual nature, we relied on the following resource: Texas Office of Court Administration, What is an Order of
Nondiclosure and How Do I Get One?, Texas Law Help, (Last updated June 28, 2021),
https://texaslawhelp.org/article/what-is-a-nondisclosure-order-and-how-do-i-get-one.
213
For instance, we assumed that 51.031 (child labor law) and 22.02(a)(2) (aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon) were ineligible.
214
Examples of such offenses in our dataset include 49.045(b), 49.09(b-4), and 49.07(c).
215
For instance, an individual convicted of Section 30.02 (Burglary), Penal Code, is ineligible if “the offense or
conduct is punishable under Subsection (d) of that section and the actor committed the offense or engaged in the
conduct with intent to commit a felony listed in Paragraph (A) or (C).” We do not have access to this data, so we
assume that all individuals convicted of burglaries are ineligible.
216
Statutory Wrongdoing and its Consequences, Tʜᴇ Tᴇxᴀs Pᴏʟɪᴛɪᴄs Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, (January 8, 2022),
https://texaspolitics.utexas.edu/archive/html/just/features/0201_01/crimeandp.html.
217
Reprinted with permission. *Thank you to Hithesh Sekhar Bathala, Obie Reynolds, and Ahmanda Lee for
contributing the concise statement as well as the shorter version of this article, published at paperprisons.org
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1. Any first time misdemeanor conviction if it is the person's only conviction or deferred
adjudication after a two-year waiting period (in which the person cannot get an add’l
convictions or deferred adjudication) following sentence completion (Sec. 411.0735).218
a. In addition to universal disqualifiers, ineligible offenses under this section include
misdemeanor offenses that are:
i. Violent or sexual in nature (with the exception of §22.01, Penal Code)
ii.
Convictions under §106.41 Alcoholic Beverage Code
iii. Driving While Intoxicated (Penal Code §49.04)
iv. Boating while Intoxicated (Penal Code §49.06)
v. Assembling or operating an amusement ride while intoxicated (Alcoholic
Beverage Code §49.065)
vi. Organized crime (Chapter 71, Penal Code)
2. Any DWI conviction under Section 49.04, Penal Code, if it is the person’s only offense
(conviction or deferred adjudication) after a two to five year waiting period (in which the
person cannot get additional convictions deferred adjudications) (Sec. 411.0736).219 (In
our model, we default to five years in order to be conservative in our estimates.)
a. In addition to universal disqualifiers, ineligible offenses include 49.04(d), Penal
Code (driving while intoxicated with a BAC greater than 0.15).
B. DEFERRED ADJUDICATIONS
1. Any felony that is sentenced to deferred adjudication community supervision after a five
year waiting period starting from community supervision completion and offense
dismissal (in which the person cannot get additional convictions deferred adjudications)
(Sec 411.0725).
a. In addition to universal disqualifiers, ineligible offenses include:
i. Driving While Intoxicated (Penal Code §49.04)
2. Any misdemeanor that is sentenced to deferred adjudication community supervision after
up to a two year waiting period starting from community supervision completion and
offense dismissal (in which the person cannot get additional convictions deferred
adjudications) (Sec 411.0725) including offenses under 49.04 and 49.06 (411.0726).
C. UNIVERSAL DISQUALIFIERS
1. Ineligible per 411.074(b) if individual has any convicted or deferred adjudication offense:
a. Requiring registration as a sex offender (Section 62.001(5))
b. Involving aggravated kidnapping (Section 20.04)
c. Involving homicide (Sections 19.02 , 19.03)
218

Please note that all offenses have a two year waiting period except for those punishable by fine-only, which do
not have a waiting period. We do not model this nuance because we use the longest waiting period to be
cosnervative in our estimates.
219
Some offenses have a two year waiting period rather than a five year waiting period. However, we default to five
years in order to be conservative in our estimates.
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d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Involving human trafficking (Sections 20A.02 , 20A.03)
Involving child/elder abuse (Sections 22.04, 22.041)
Involving family violence (Sections 25.07 , 25.072 , 71.004)
Involving stalking (Section 42.072)
Flying while Intoxicated (Penal Code §49.05)

D. UNMODELED CRITERIA
1. Did not model expunctions eligibility for non-convictions. (Art. 55.01(a))
2. Did not model shorter waiting period for certain deferred adjudication community
supervision under 411.072 (first time non-violent misdemeanor offenses) or 411.0726
(deferred adjudication for DWI)
3. Did not include sealing eligibility for individuals that successfully complete veteran’s
treatment court (Sec. 411.0727)
4. Did not include sealing eligibility by individuals that are victims of trafficking (Sec.
411.0728)
5. Did not model expunction eligibility for Class C Misdemeanors sentenced to community
supervision (Article 55.01(a)(2)).
6. Did not model whether LFOs were repaid
7. Did not model whether certain deferred adjudication offenses eligible for OND/sealing
had “affirmative finding under Article 42A.105(f), Code of Criminal Procedure...filed in
the papers of the case” (411.072(a)(1)(b), 411.0726(a)(2))
8. Did not model whether certain deferred adjudication offenses otherwise eligible for
OND/sealing had findings under “former Section 5(k), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal
Procedure...filed in the papers of the case” (411.072(a)(1)(b)).
9. Did not model certain offenses requiring registration as a sex offender (62.05(D),
62.05(E), 62.05(G), 62.05(H), 62.05(I)), that would be universally ineligible.
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Appendix Table 1: Detailed View of The Texas Second Chance Gap
Population

People in the
People Eligible for People Eligible for
Criminal Population Any Records Relief Sealing of All
Convictions

Estimated Number of
4.8M
People with Convictions

675,305

59663

% Male

87%

85%

85%

Top Felony Deferred
poss cs pg 1 <1g
Adjudication
(11.4%), DWI 3rd or
Community Supervision more (4.2%),
burglary (3.7%)

poss cs pg 1 <1g,
driving while
intoxicated 3rd or
more iat

Top Convictions Misdemeanors

poss marij <2oz
(8.3%), DWI
(5.6%), assault
(3.7%)

driving while
intoxicated, poss
marij <2oz, driving
while intoxicated
2nd

driving while
intoxicated, poss
marij <2oz, assault
causes bodily injury
family member

Avg Years since last
Conviction

12.6

17

19

Share of People whose
Last Conviction was
10+ Years Ago

2,407,274(~49.87%) 446,535

49,537

Average Age at First
Conviction

28

28.26

27.86

Average Current Age of 45
People with Convictions

47

46

Median Years since last 11
Conviction

15

20

White and Latinx %
(share in pop = 82%)

0.69

0.73

0.69

Black % (share in pop = 0.31
13%)

0.26

0.3

Asian % (share in pop = 0.01
5%)

0.01

0.01
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APPENDIX B: DATA SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 220
Data Statistics
Number of People in Dataset

4,826,860

Sample Size

153,674
OND Sample Data Statistics

Number of People with Misdemeanor Convictions in Sample

94,403 (61.45%)

Estimated Number of People with Misdemeanor Convictions in Population

2,966,662

Number of People with Felony Convictions in Sample

122,611 (79.81%)

Estimated Number of People with Felony Convictions in Population

3,853,113

Average Age of Misdemeanor Convictions

46 years old

APPENDIX C: COMMON CHARGES221
A. Top 10 Charges in our Dataset
B. Top 10 Misdemeanor Convictions in Sample
C. Top 10 Felony Convictions in Sample
D. Top 10 Charges Eligible for OND in our Dataset
Table A. Top 10 Charges in Sample
Charges

Number of
Records

Percentage of Number of People
Charges
with Charges

poss cs pg 1 <1g

335,265

12.97%

36,232

poss marij <2oz

238,491

9.22%

34,202

driving while intoxicated

147,550

5.71%

27,365

burglary of habitation

116,005

4.49%

13,836

driving while intoxicated 3rd or more iat

111,187

4.3%

12,627

assault causes bodily injury family
member

103,171

3.99%

17,562

poss cs pg 1 >=1g<4g

95,857

3.71%

12,585

220
221

A shorter version of this article is available at paperprisons.org
A shorter version of this article is available at paperprisons.org
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assault causes bodily inj

75,109

2.9%

12,107

burglary of building

72,598

2.81%

8,004

unauth use of vehicle

67,916

2.63%

8,311

Table B. Top 10 Misdemeanor Convictions in Sample
Charges

Number of
Records

Percentage of Number of People
Charges
with Charges

poss marij <2oz

215379

8.33%

34166

driving while intoxicated

145373

5.62%

27335

assault causes bodily injury family
member

95485

3.69%

17521

assault causes bodily inj

69788

2.7%

12079

driving while intoxicated 2nd

55722

2.15%

10659

fail to id fugitive intent give false info

53855

2.08%

8688

resist arrest search or transport

53052

2.05%

8812

driving w/lic inv w/prev conv/susp/w/o
fin res

39245

1.52%

6796

poss cs pg 3 < 28g

27195

1.05%

5233

evading arrest detention

26269

1.02%

5500

Table C. Top 10 Felony Convictions in Sample
Charges

Number of
Records

Percentage of Number of People
Charges
with Charges

poss cs pg 1 <1g

295925

11.44%

35970

driving while intoxicated 3rd or more iat

108898

4.21%

12573

burglary of habitation

95745

3.7%

13789

poss cs pg 1 >=1g<4g

81261

3.14%

12557

burglary of building

64327

2.49%

7864

unauth use of vehicle

61414

2.37%

8236

man del cs pg 1 <1g

54832

2.12%

5957

forgery financial instrument

54563

2.11%

7046

man del cs pg 1 >=4g<200g

50568

1.96%

8240
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poss cs pg 1 >=4g<200g

41772

1.62%

6936

Table D. Top 10 Misdemeanor Conviction Charges Eligible for OND in our Dataset
Charges Eligible for OND

Number of
Records

Percentage of
Charges

Number of People
with Charges

poss marij <2oz

10,315

0.4%

10,315

assault causes bodily injury family
member222

4,648

0.18%

4,648

assault causes bodily inj

3,651

0.14%

3,651

driving while intoxicated 2nd

3,169

0.12%

3,169

fail to id fugitive intent give false info

2,372

0.09%

2,372

resist arrest search or transport

2,217

0.09%

2,217

poss cs pg 3 < 28g

1,041

0.04%

1,041

evading arrest detention

1,027

0.04%

1,027

theft prop >=$100<$750

579

0.02%

579

poss dangerous drug

444

0.02%

444

APPENDIX D: ROBUSTNESS TEST AND HISTOGRAM FOR SENTENCE
EXPIRATION DATE ASSUMPTIONS

222

In Texas, assault is not considered a violent felony as listed in 411.0735(c-1):
https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.411.htm
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The two bars on the left show the average number of years in jail when records with missing
sentence expiration date are excluded. The blue bar shows the average number of years for
felony charges and the orange bar shows the average number of years of misdemeanor charges.
The two bars on the right show the average number of years in jail when records with missing
sentence expiration date are assumed to be sentence start date + 2.9 years for misdemeanor
convictions and + 3.2 years for felony convictions.
APPENDIX E: DETAILED RECORD RELIEF STATISTICS 223
We obtained OND statistics from the Texas Department of Public Safety, which reports
that 18,593 ONDs were processed between fiscal years 2014 and 2019. In addition, we obtained
the number of ODLs granted from the Texas Department of Public Safety, which reports that
44,812 ODLs were granted between September 2017 and February 2020.224 A breakdown of
each type of relief granted by year is available in Table H below.
Table H. Breakdown of Relief Granted Each Year in Texas
Year

ONDs Processed in Fiscal Year

ODLs Granted in Calendar Year

2020

N/A

2,637*

2019

2,650

16,350

2018

2,558

15,831

2017

2,313

12,637+

2016

2,360

N/A

2015

4,258

N/A

2014

4,454

N/A

*ODLs granted for 2017 are from September 2017 - December 2017
+ODLs granted for 2020 are from January 2020 - February 2020

223

A shorter version of this information is available at paperprisons.org
Driver License Division High Value Set, Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏғ Pᴜʙʟɪᴄ Sᴀғᴇᴛʏ, (February 2020, January 2020,
December 2019, November 2019, October 2019, September 2019, August 2019, July 2019, June 2019, May 2019,
April 2019, March 2019, February 2019, January 2019, December 2018, November 2018, October 2018, September
2018, August 2018, July 2018, June 2018, May 2018, April 2018, March 2018, February 2018, January 2018,
December 2017, November 2018, October 2017, September 2017) (data last available January 23, 2022 at
https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/driver-license/driver-license-division-high-value-data-sets).
224
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APPENDIX F: CLEARANCE CRITERIA CHALLENGES AND LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING ALTERNATIVES 225
Criteria

Administrative
Challenge

Example

Drafting
Alternative

Sentence
Completion
(OND)

Not tracked in
court data and
hard to infer as
clean sentencing
data is often not
available; it also
is often unclear
whether or not
outstanding fines
and fees must be
paid, and whether
they have been.

First
conviction;
qualifying
conditions
(OND)

Lack of unique
identifier across
precludes
determination

Personal
demographic
trait such as
age, military
status, or other
condition
(OND)

Information may
not be easily
ascertainable /
available on the
record or charge
category
condition

“(a) This section applies only to a person
who successfully completes a veterans
treatment court program under Chapter
124 or former law.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this subchapter or Subchapter F, a
person described by Subsection (a) is
entitled to file with the court that placed
the person in the veterans treatment court
program a petition for an order of
nondisclosure of criminal history record
information under this section...”
(Tex. Gov. Code 411.0727)

Specify an
identification
strategy that
can be
implemented
at scale or do
not include
demographic
traits

Class or grade
condition
(OND)

Missing class,
grade or category
information

“A person may petition the court that
imposed the sentence for an order of
nondisclosure of criminal history record
information under this section only on or
after: (1) the date of completion of the

Explicitly
specify the
qualifying
crimes

“Notwithstanding any other provision of Disposition
this subchapter or Subchapter F, a person Date (+ X
described by Subsection (a) who
Years)
completes the person's sentence,
including any term of confinement
imposed and payment of all fines, costs,
and restitution imposed, may petition the
court that imposed the sentence for an
order of nondisclosure of criminal
history record information under this
section…” (Tex. Gov. Code 411.0735(b))
Bless
commercial
identification
approximation
technique

225

Adapted from Colleen Chien et al., The Texas Second Chance Non-Disclosure/Sealing Gap, Pᴀᴘᴇʀ Pʀɪsᴏɴs
Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, (last visited September 19, 2021), https://www.paperprisons.org/states/TX.html and Colleen Chien,
America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gaps, 119 Mɪᴄʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 519 (2020).
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person's sentence, if the offense of which
the person was convicted was a
misdemeanor punishable by fine only; or
(2) the second anniversary of the date of
completion of the person's sentence, if
the offense of which the person was
convicted was a misdemeanor other than
a misdemeanor described by Subdivision
(1).” (Tex. Gov. Code 411.0735(d))
Court-ordered
conditions
(OND and
ODL)

Require
individual review
/check for any
“court-ordered”
conditions and
compliance re:
same

Laundry list
Vulnerable to
disposition
changes to
criteria (OND) definitions,
requires detailed
clean data

“All reinstatement fees must be paid
prior to applying for, renewing, or
upgrading a driver license. This includes
applying for an occupational or interlock
driver license.” (Texas Department of
Public Safety, Driver’s License, Section
7: Reinstatement Fees)

Do not include
court-ordered
conditions,
waive fees
repayment or
allow for
garnishing of
wages

“A person may not be granted an order of
nondisclosure of criminal history record
information under this subchapter…if:
(1) the person requests the order of
nondisclosure for, or the person has been
previously convicted of or placed on
deferred adjudication community
supervision for: (A) an offense requiring
registration as a sex offender under
Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure;
(B) an offense under Section 20.04,
Penal Code, regardless of whether the
offense is a reportable conviction or
adjudication for purposes of Chapter 62,
Code of Criminal Procedure; (C) an
offense under Section 19.02, 19.03,
20A.02, 20A.03, 22.04, 22.041, 25.07,
25.072, or 42.072, Penal Code; or (D)
any other offense involving family
violence, as defined by Section 71.004,
Family Code; or (2) the court makes an
affirmative finding that the offense for
which the order of nondisclosure is
requested involved family violence, as
defined by Section 71.004, Family
Code.” (Tex. Gov’t Code Section
411.074(b)

Simple
description
e.g. “All
records that do
not end in a
conviction”
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